воскресенье, 18 октября 2020 г.

The Serial Innovation Imperative - THE MOST INNOVATIVE COMPANIES 2020

 


Facing turbulent and fast-changing markets, innovators need a well-tuned innovation system that can spot emerging product, service, and business model opportunities—and then rapidly develop and successfully scale them—over and over again.


Successful Serial Innovators Get Three Things Right

1) They “Walk the Talk”

Successful Innovators Walk the Talk


By Michael RingelRamón BaezaRahool Panandiker, and Johann D. Harnoss


In innovation—as in life—drive, size, and skill are a powerful combination. Drive to set an ambitious agenda and fund promising opportunities. Size to transform these opportunities into real sources of new revenue. And the skill, as embodied in a well-tuned innovation system, to be able to do it over and over again.

And the world’s most innovative companies have been getting bigger. The revenue of a typical “small” company on BCG’s 2020 list of the 50 most innovative companies is $30 billion—up more than 170% from $11 billion (in constant dollars) in our first survey in 2005.


But drive and size mean little if your innovation system can’t build on them for serial success. And here our research offers a more sobering assessment. Serial innovation is hard. Of the 162 companies that have been on our top 50 list over the past 14 years, nearly 30% appeared just once—and 57% appeared three times or fewer. Only 8 companies have made the list every year: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, HP, IBM, Microsoft, Samsung, and Toyota.

When we began the research for this 14th edition of BCG’s Most Innovative Companies report, COVID-19 had not yet emerged. As we explored the data and interacted with clients, however, it became clear that this year’s core findings—about the advantages of scale and the imperative for serial innovation—may be even more relevant today as innovation leaders need to adapt to rapidly shifting patterns of supply, demand, consumer behavior, and ways of doing business.

Moreover, our research has shown that companies doubling down on innovation during downturns—using the opportunity to invest and position for the recovery—outperform over the long term. But doing that successfully requires developing a clear innovation strategy and supporting it with appropriate investment, leveraging the advantages of scale, and ensuring that your innovation system is nimble enough to spot and seize the best opportunities quickly and decisively. As we explore these themes, we draw on our global innovation performance database of more than 1,000 firms to detail the practices that make the best stand out from the rest.

COMMITTING TO INNOVATION

Innovation is a top-three management priority for almost two-thirds of companies. This is the lowest level since the financial crisis in 2009 and 2010—perhaps reflecting the uncertain economic outlook amid geopolitical tensions even before the outbreak of COVID-19.

We can disaggregate our findings further. “Committed innovators” (45% of the total) say that innovation is a top priority, and they support that commitment with significant investment. “Skeptical innovators” (30% of the total) are the reverse, seeing innovation as neither a strategic priority nor a significant target of funding. And “confused innovators” (25% of the total) are in between, with a mismatch between the stated strategic importance of innovation and their level of funding for it. (See Exhibit 1.) We find the highest proportion of committed innovators in the financial and pharmaceutical sectors (both 56%)—and the lowest in industrial goods (37%) and wholesale and retail (32%).



Committed innovators are winning. Almost 60% of them report generating a rising proportion of sales from products and services launched in the past three years, compared with only 30% of the skeptics and 47% of the confused. The skeptics may or may not be making wise strategic decisions—it is sometimes neither strategically sound nor feasible to pursue innovation leadership—but at least they are consistent. The confused are a puzzling lot with a worrying disconnect between strategy and innovation spending.

And winners are more likely to be committed innovators, further evidence of the divide between the best and the rest that we have discussed in the past few innovation reports. In 2019, for example, we found a wide gulf between strong and weak innovators with respect to their use of artificial intelligence (AI). We also discovered that strong innovators were making increasing use of external innovation channels such as incubators and partnerships with academic institutions. Our 2018 research showed that almost 80% of strong innovators have properly digitized innovation processes compared with less than 30% of weak innovators. The relationship between commitment and results is the latest evidence of the strong getting stronger—across a spectrum of innovation-related criteria.

HOW COMMITTED INNOVATORS ARE PLACING THEIR BETS

While many companies struggle to address multiple innovation challenges at once, committed innovators prioritize a handful and as a result address them more effectively. They focus on advanced analytics, digital design, and technology platforms. (See Exhibit 2.) Companies may embrace these enablers for different reasons. Advanced analytics, for example, are a top priority for industrial goods companies that are seeking to develop new analytics-driven value propositions, such as agricultural equipment manufacturers moving into precision farming enabled by the Internet of Things (IoT).


Even among committed innovators, only 60% report success in solving the challenges they prioritize. All companies have plenty of room to improve but doing so may be hampered by the “AI paradox” we pointed to last year—the ease of achieving powerful results with AI pilots and the difficulty of replicating those results at scale. Another issue is the challenge of making success repeatable, establishing a successful serial innovation machine. (See the related article in the 2020 report, “When It Comes to Innovation, Once Is Not Enough”)

Consider the example of Target. The company is making a major push to innovate in its core store-based retail business and achieve synergies between offline and online commerce. Target doubled capital expenditures from 2016 to 2018. The intent is to attract foot traffic by making stores more interactive—for example, customers can better imagine how products fit their homes by using augmented-reality point-of-sale displays. The company also wants to create omnichannel customer journeys so that shoppers can seamlessly move among channels, ordering at home and picking up in stores, for instance. Target’s online sales growth outpaced its competitors in 2019, and in a sector that has been under sustained disruptive attack, it generated 25% annualized TSR for the past three years.

INNOVATION AND DISRUPTION

Since 2015, we have asked executives to name not only the three companies they regard as the top innovators across all industries but also the three most innovative companies in their own industry. This year, we noted a new and surprising pattern: compared with 2015, significantly more respondents named companies traditionally associated with a different industry as a leading innovator in their own industry. Think Amazon in health care or Alibaba in financial services.

In a world where every industry is becoming a technology industry to some degree, this kind of boundary-busting innovation is an increasingly important innovation capability. We have therefore added a new scoring dimension to our most innovative companies ranking methodology that captures each company’s variety and intensity of boundary breaking. Granted, some companies have always been boundary busting. For example, 3M has innovated in multiple industries over the years, including consumer goods, chemicals, manufacturing, and medtech. Yet today, we already see significantly more such activity compared with 2016—an increase of 20%. New players that are active across industry borders and exemplify this trend include firms such as Sony, Nike, Xiaomi, and JD.com.

Looking at the data on the industry level, software and services companies are the ones most frequently cited as entering other sectors—further confirmation (if any is needed) of venture capitalist Marc Andreessen’s 2011 observation that “software is eating the world”—but tech is far from the only cross-industry disruptive innovation force. (See Exhibit 3.) Automakers, chemical companies, retailers, and industrial manufacturers are also playing more and more often in other companies’ sandboxes as they see opportunities for new technology-enabled business models and revenue streams outside their own core businesses.



These disruptors are often orchestrating ecosystems that bring together the capabilities of multiple participants in a new platform or service offering. The auto industry’s shift toward autonomous driving and a mobility model is one prominent example, as demonstrated by Sony, Alphabet, and Apple, as well as automotive companies such as Tesla, Volkswagen, and Bosch.

The IoT and other technologies create opportunities for traditional companies, such as manufacturers, to transform themselves into data-enabled software or service businesses. These companies often play offense and defense simultaneously. Think of the ongoing transformations in the automotive, aircraft, and farm equipment industries, where companies are moving from manufacturing equipment to combining equipment, data, software, and connectivity to provide entirely new types of solutions. The data suggests that successful self-disruptors earned an annual TSR premium of 2.7 percentage points from 2016 to 2019 over companies that focused solely on defending their own turf.


A clear innovation ambition, appropriate resourcing, and the ability to break industry boundaries are not the only prerequisites for innovation success. As we examine in the companion articles that make up this year’s report, winners find a number of ways to differentiate themselves. And large companies are increasingly using size to flex their innovation muscles and may be even more advantaged now than In Innovation, Big Is Back.

2) They Embrace the Benefits of Scale

In Innovation, Big Is Back



Conventional wisdom suggests that when it comes to innovation, small companies have the edge. They are quick and nimble. They have no legacy organizations, technology, or infrastructure to hold them back. Because they are often privately owned, they can play for the longer term. Big companies, by contrast, are weighed down by internal bureaucracy, bound by out-of-date systems and ways of working, and if publicly traded, too focused on the next quarter’s earnings to think about the longer term.

But even before the crisis, the data suggested a more nuanced picture. While smaller companies’ scale makes coordination easier—and helps ensure that they stay closer to customers—our research found that the innovation success rates of smaller companies were not higher in any statistically significant way than those of larger ones. And today, given the greater ability of larger companies to fund investments from their own cash flows, some of them may actually have an edge.

Of course, if size is not an impediment to innovation, it stops being an excuse for underperformance. After all, as we show in a companion article in this year’s report, the most innovative companies in BCG’s annual listing have been getting larger. So what distinguishes the large companies that are innovation winners from the rest?


THE BIG ENGINES THAT CAN

Large companies face a few common obstacles. The top two issues cited by all large firms in our 2020 innovation survey are a lack of discipline in resource allocation, including insufficient rigor in cutting questionable projects while putting muscle behind those with promise (31%), and the difficulty of uniting the organization behind the innovation strategy (27%).

But not all large companies are alike. More than 40% of the big companies (defined as $1 billion or more in revenue) in our 2020 sample overcome these two key obstacles. They fall into the innovation leaders category—that is, they generate a larger percentage of sales from products or services launched within the past three years than their industry median. This compares with on average 50% of the smaller firms surveyed. (See Exhibit 1.) So, smaller companies are more likely to outperform the large firms, but the difference is small in magnitude and not statistically significant.


MORE BANG FOR THE BUCK

Innovation leaders appear to be remarkably alike, regardless of size. Smaller leaders make investments in innovation as a percentage of sales at a similar level as bigger companies. They are equivalent in speed to market and achieve comparable returns. The real distinctions emerge when we look at what distinguishes large leaders from other large firms.

Large innovators that outperform their big-company peers put more money behind their innovation programs—1.4 times more as a percentage of sales—and they get far greater payoffs: four times as much as a percentage of sales. (See Exhibit 2.) Surprisingly, they also take time to get things right, with large leaders reporting average times to market for innovation outside their core that are up to five months longer than the times for others.


OVERCOMING BARRIERS

So among the larger innovators, what are the key differences between the leaders and the laggards? To our surprise, culture does not appear to be one of them. In fact, the cultures of large companies, both leaders and laggards, look very similar. (See Exhibit 3.) Granted, an innovation culture is notoriously hard to describe or assess. Still, the data suggests culture may not be a precondition for, but rather have a correlation with—or even be an outcome of—innovation success.


Leading large innovators pursue different priorities and more carefully design their innovation systems for impact. Laggards must first put a lot of attention into fixing the basics: building new and critical incubation or development skills, gaining leadership support, and establishing strategic clarity on the direction of innovation efforts. Leaders seem to have the luxury to address higher-order issues, however, such as filling gaps in product-market fit and building a stable of scalable external partners. Leaders are also about 15% more likely to prioritize business model innovation although not uniformly across industries. (See Exhibit 4.) Innovation at the business model level—to defend existing profit engines, to imagine entirely new offerings in response to emerging customer needs, or to adapt current business models to ongoing shifts in the business environment—can provide an important edge, particularly in turbulent environments.

These differences do not suggest that some strategic choices are better than others. They do spotlight the importance of having an internally consistent systematic approach to innovation.

DESIGNING A WINNING INNOVATION SYSTEM

Deeper analysis of the differences between leaders and laggards in the same industry (as well as BCG’s client experience) points to leaders expanding their advantage in five aspects of their innovation systems. These are talent, ambition, governance, funnel management, and project management.

Our benchmarking database reveals that achieving just one level of improvement on our five-point maturity scale in any one of these five aspects can result in an increase in innovation output (the percentage of sales from products, services, or business models introduced in the past three years) of 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points. A one-level improvement in all five dimensions raises innovation output by 3.4 points—a big yet very much achievable number for any large company.

Inspiring Ambition. Leaders align their innovation ambition with corporate strategy and communicate the connection. The organization has a clear, shared understanding of what it means by “innovation.” Leaders also back their ambition with resource commitments of capital, operating budgets, and staff, as well as top management support. We recently helped a large energy company set its innovation ambition in an iterative process that took into account organic growth expectations and the projected shrinking size of the running business. On that basis, we derived the target growth from innovation and then validated this target with bottom-up growth potentials from different market segments. We then further assessed the resulting ambition against the availability of funds and talent.

One Steering System. Leaders increase their odds of success by establishing good-governance practices and regularly adjusting them as needs change. For example, most large companies now have a varied set of ecosystem partners and vehicles—including internal incubators, venture funds, and accelerators—to accelerate innovation by complementing their in-house development efforts. In practice, these vehicles often overlap in scope, undermining their effectiveness. We observed this dynamic at a global manufacturing company that had various vehicles with overlapping mandates, creating competitive tensions and leading to disconnects with the core business. The company corrected these overlaps by setting up a coherent steering system with specific roles and success metrics for each vehicle.

Talent First. Leaders work toward making their innovation teams go-to destinations for internal and external talent. They devote resources to attracting, training, and retaining the best people they can find—often prioritizing those with entrepreneurial experience. Yet what really drives performance, in our view, is their ability to allocate their best internal talent to innovation teams. One medtech company elevated the role of head of R&D to chief technology officer (a board-level position), trained technical managers in business so that they could become product owners capable of leading cross-functional teams, and now delivers more new digitally enabled solutions than ever.

Portfolio Mindset. Leaders pay close attention to the shape and quality of their innovation funnel—and the processes to manage it. Not surprisingly, leaders tend to have broader funnels: they have the capacity to generate more potentially valuable ideas and convert their best ideas into scalable products or services. Funnel management ultimately comes down to the quality of decision making in a few critical go or no-go decisions, as well as the ability to take both a project and a portfolio perspective at the same time. Winners create the context for better decision making by establishing a focused set of tools and criteria for making the right call, ensuring the ideal balance between hands-off and hands-on involvement, and setting the right incentives, such as not penalizing innovation teams for flagging issues or even recommending a late project pivot.

What’s more, leaders consistently run postmortem analyses to make sure that they learn from mistakes. The best innovators do this not only for failed projects but also for funding decisions that, with the benefit of hindsight, look like false positives or false negatives, to ensure better-quality decision making going forward.

Empowered Teams. Ultimately, the innovation success of a company lives and dies with the quality of its innovation teams. Good teams are small (they adhere to Jeff Bezos’s two-pizza rule) yet functionally diverse, that is, they are staffed with a mix of product managers, engineers, and designers. They typically combine data-driven (patent scanning, for example) and human-centric (such as ethnographic) methods to find solutions to problems that add value for customers.

These teams need a healthy degree of autonomy, embedded in a supportive governance framework. Ideally, they are led by a strong product owner whose top task is to maximize the desirability and viability of the innovation while keeping it technically feasible to deliver in an acceptable time and at an acceptable cost. Incentives matter. Less successful companies tend to manage teams on delivery against expected outputs, while leaders reward high-quality outcomes. A high-quality outcome could be a resounding in-market success but also the early demise of an initially promising but ultimately doomed idea.

We recently assisted a large automotive company in improving the elements of its innovation system. Early idea generation at the company now starts by pairing deep technology and regulatory foresight with customer centricity. In cross-functional ideation sessions focused on anticipated future market opportunities, teams iteratively refine their ideas by drawing up a mockup product-launch press release. These teams address technical, market, and business risks by running an open backlog of implicit, to-be-validated beliefs. Through such methodical testing, the biggest innovation risks are addressed first, greatly improving the odds of an ultimate in-market success. Senior managers set an inspiring yet achievable ambition. They make decisions on the portfolio and funnel of projects every two months, ensuring thoughtful and timely decisions well informed by their proximity to the action.


Being a great innovator is not just about embracing best practices such as the ones detailed above, although doing that is table stakes. It’s also about spotting changes in the technology or regulatory environment, in markets, and in social norms, and then understanding which doors these changes open and which they shut. In many ways, the most successful companies see innovation as a learning journey in which the destination shifts in response to changing travel conditions. As it turns out, the real innovation challenge for large companies isn’t achieving one great success—When It Comes to Innovation, Once Is Not Enough.

3) They Calibrate Their Innovation Systems for Success

When It Comes to Innovation, Once Is Not Enough



Remember the Macarena? The song shot to the top of 15 global music charts in 1996 and was certified platinum in seven countries. It was also a one-hit wonder. The band that created it, Los del Rio, did just fine—but they never topped the charts again.

Startups have it relatively easy. They’re only expected to get it right once. If they do, and are acquired by a larger company, it’s a big victory. Larger companies are held to a higher standard. Their valuations depend on the market’s belief that they will be able to innovate successfully into the future. If they don’t, they’re punished by the market.

As we mentioned earlier, of the 162 companies that have made BCG’s annual ranking of the 50 most innovative companies since 2005, only eight made the list every year—and only 12% ranked in the top 50 ten or more times. (See Exhibit 1.) Serial innovation is hard. But in the current rapidly shifting customer and competitive environment, it is essential.


The 20 companies that made the list more than ten times come from a diverse set of industries—tech of course but also retail, automotive, industrial goods, and consumer products. (For a look at the 50 companies on the list in 2020 and the evolution of the top 50 over the past 14 years, explore this interactive exhibit.) Elon Musk of Tesla (which has made the list seven times) famously argued that even more important than the product is “the machine that makes the machine.” He has a point. Serial innovators succeed not because of the qualities of any individual offering. Rather, they draw on the strength of their underlying innovation systems, which integrate strategy, ecosystems, portfolio management, governance, development, performance management, and more into one seamless and mutually supportive whole. So what does it take to get it right again and again?

SYSTEMATIZING INNOVATION SUCCESS

Successful innovation pays. An investment of $100 made in the MSCI World Index in 2005 would have been worth $251 at the end of 2019. The same $100 invested in BCG’s 50 most innovative companies (assuming annual reweighting) would have grown to $327—30% more. Over the 15 years that we have produced this report, the top innovators have outperformed the companies in the MSCI index by more than 1 percentage point a year on sales growth and by 2 percentage points annually on total shareholder return (TSR).

Everyone knows the parable of the blind men and the elephant: each man can feel and describe a part of the animal, but none of them can get a sense of the whole. Elephants are big; innovation systems are complicated and multifaceted. They involve people and teams from multiple functions. They can have lots of moving organizational parts: R&D, ecosystem partners, incubators, accelerators, and corporate venture funds, for example. They include decision-making systems, processes to guide activities, as well as many less tangible factors such as embedded tools, capabilities, and cultural norms of behavior. In recent years, we have examined specific aspects of such systems: how successful innovators source ideas, how they collaborate, how they organize to support innovation, and how they incorporate new technologies into their programs.

Companies with strong innovation systems do all these things well. But that’s often not enough. Innovation systems are dynamic. They need to be designed and regularly reworked to deliver the desired level of organic profitable growth—but they always need to be seen as a whole. On the basis of our research and experience, we assess innovation systems on ten elements. Seven relate to the innovation platforms and organization that set ambition, define innovation domains, delimit roles, shape portfolios, and measure and reward performance. And three are associated with the actual practice of moving a portfolio of projects to impact. (See Exhibit 2.)


The data from BCG’s innovation benchmarking database shows that companies with better systems achieve an increase of 5 to 20 percentage points in their innovation output (the percentage of sales from products, services, or business models introduced in the past three years).

In our experience, the most successful large innovators take a page from the instruction manual of serial acquirers and systematize the success factors. Serial acquirers integrate the discipline of effective M&A (from target identification and analysis to price setting and negotiation to rigorous post-merger integration) into their management systems. Serial innovators also understand that success depends on all facets of innovation working together toward a common goal of generating a continuing series of new products or services that make an impact where it counts—in the marketplace.

GETTING STARTED

It’s difficult for leaders, even those with 20-20 vision into their organizations, to get their arms around the entire machine and identify what’s working and what isn’t. In most large organizations, the CEO is the only leader who is in a position of authority to drive an innovation system. All other leaders are left with partial or functional mandates. For them to drive change, they need to build exceptional stakeholder orchestration skills in order to cut through silos and build coalitions across the organization.

An effective innovation journey starts with doing the careful work of establishing a common language on innovation, building a fact base for framing the challenge, and getting CEO buy-in. Only then can leaders decide which issues to attack first. What is working well? What are their companies’ most pressing weaknesses? What should they scrutinize first—strategy, governance, process, talent, incentives, culture, or something else?

We have found that a series of pointed questions, each of which focuses on one of the ten essential elements of the company’s innovation system, provide a good way to start. We derived these questions from BCG’s experience working in innovation and validated them against our benchmarking database containing data on the innovation performance and organization of more than 1,000 firms. The questions for innovators in a post-COVID-19 world reflect the typical gaps we see between leading innovators (benchmark companies) and those aiming to join their ranks:

  • Innovation Ambition. Do we have a shared innovation purpose? Have we established an aspirational goal aligned with corporate strategy and value creation targets that rallies our best talent to invent better ways to serve customers and society?
  • Innovation Domains. Is our innovation strategy grounded in deep customer insight and foresight that help us decide what to do—and not do—and enable us to nimbly adjust to shifting opportunities? Do we focus on a limited number of innovation domains where we have a right to win?
  • Innovation Governance. Do we ensure that people and budgets are aligned with our shared innovation priorities—and promptly realigned when priorities shift—even when multiple stakeholders have a voice?
  • Performance Management. Do our metrics and incentives reward both predictable, incremental progress and successful step-change innovation? Do we recognize leaders who are not only able to push new ideas but also recognize failures early in the process?
  • Organization and Ecosystems. Do we have clear roles for all the disparate elements of our broader innovation ecosystem—for example, R&D units, venturing vehicles, digital units, and external partners—to ensure that we collaborate seamlessly and realize our targets?
  • Talent and Culture. Do we have true business builders, and do we allocate our very best talent to our most ambitious innovation challenges?
  • Idea-to-Market Fit. What’s the last truly novel idea we developed that solved a “hair on fire” problem for customers?
  • Project Management. Do we have a clear view of our unfair advantage relative to our competition, and do we actually manage to wield it?
  • Funnel Management. Is our funnel of potentially valuable projects actually funnel-shaped or is it a cylinder? Do we learn from past mistakes?
  • Portfolio Management. Do we manage our portfolio strategically, for example, to ensure balance between core and noncore, or among new products, services, and business models? Do we take nonconsensus bets that promise outsize rewards? Have we reassessed and rebalanced our priorities and our portfolio through the COVID-19 lens?

Consider the well-known history of Apple. Ranked #1 in our top 50 list for all but one year since 2005, Apple is a poster child of successful innovation. But in the late 1990s the company was in trouble, losing out to the Wintel platform. After Steve Jobs’s return in 1997, he set about recalibrating the company’s innovation system for success. He broadened the ecosystem by engaging Microsoft as a partner, strengthened governance by focusing development on the projects most likely to drive value such as the iMac, and increased ambition by defining new domains for innovation (iPod in 2001, iTunes Music Store in 2003). These moves generated the resources and attracted the talent that fueled Apple’s serial innovation machine, which now—against the odds—outlives its original founder.


An effective innovation system takes time and experience to build. Practice, as well as learning from both successes and failures, is essential. Our list of ten questions does not replace the need for a more systematic assessment. From time to time, a company needs to reassess and revalidate all the elements of its innovation system—the “machine that makes the machine”—to ensure that it is delivering maximum value. Still, in our experience, these questions provide a starting point for innovation leaders to build a case for change, rally other stakeholders, and point to a first set of points for action. Successful serial innovators are made, not born.




THE 50 MOST INNOVATIVE COMPANIES FOR 2020

The BCG most innovative companies ranking is based in large part on a survey of 2,500 global innovation executives (63% C level, 37% senior vice-president or vice-president level) who were polled from August 2019 through October 2019. We assess companies’ performance on four dimensions and then take an average of normalized scores to calculate the overall ranking. This year, as noted in the text, we added a new scoring dimension that captures each company’s variety and in-tensity of boundary breaking, by assessing its ability to breach established industry entry barriers and play in an array of markets out-side its own. These four dimensions are:

The 50 Most Innovative Companies of 2020


Source: BCG Global Innovation Survey.

Note: Returnees have appeared on the ranking before but not in the prior year. Values in parentheses show change in ranking from 2019.

https://www.bcg.com/

Who Are the World’s Most Innovative Companies? It Depends on Who You Ask

 


Ask most folks to tick off their list of who they think are the world’s most innovative companies, and you’re likely to get something along these lines… Apple, Google, Amazon, Nike, GE, and so on.   All are high verve, well known brands.   But these are subjective perceptions based purely on top–of–mind recall and lasting impressions… a sort of popularity contest if you will.   Not that such impressions aren’t important… they’re very important for the purposes of brand equity, but is brand equity an indicator of innovativeness?

In fact, there are several institutions who now attempt to make a list of the world’s most innovative companies.   We at Legacy Innovation Group have cross-referenced four of the most important of these — those from Fast Company, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), Forbes, andThomson Innovation.   The first two of these take a somewhat subjective look at the subject.   The latter two attempt to take a completely objective look at it.

Fast Company uses their own (undisclosed) methodology to come up with a list of what are probably the companies most changing the world at any given time.   They get this list (which we like).   BCG attempts to capture perceptionsfrom inside of industry by surveying company executives about how they perceive their own companies and who they perceive to be the most innovative companies.   From this survey, they get this list of perceptions.

By contrast, Forbes and Thomson attempt to take an entirely objective look at who are the most innovative companies in the world.   The problem, however, is that even when they attempt to be objective, they still get very different answers.   Ask Forbes who they think are the 100 most innovative companies in the world, and you’ll get this list.   Ask Thomson Innovation this exact same question, and you’ll get this list.   Now, compare these two lists.   What you’ll notice if you look close enough is that not a single company shows up on both lists!   We have 200 companies here, and all 200 are, indeed, very innovative in their own right, but not a single one is considered to be amongst the most innovative companies by both of these parties.

So why the disagreement?   Why do Fast Company, BCG, Forbes, and Thomson all come up with different answers?   It happens because all these parties have taken different views of how to define what “innovation” is.   In the case of Forbes, they’re using a methodology called theInnovation Premium developed by Jeff Dyer and Hal Gregersen, authors of The Innovator’s DNA.   The Innovation Premium is based on financial investment figures… literally the difference between the company’s market capitalization and a net present value of cash flows from existing businesses, the difference between these being the bonus given by equity investors on the educated hunch that the company will continue to come up with profitable new growth (thus the premium gets built into their stock price).   This method is, admittedly, very speculative and has not born a correlation to subsequent investor returns.   The price of entry here is seven years of public financial data and a minimum market cap of $10B, with industries excluded that have no major investments in R&D (omitting most service–oriented industries and commodity–based industries like energy and mining).   In the case of Thomson Innovation, their methodology is based purely on Intellectual Property activity.   More specifically, their algorithm looks at the volume of “innovation patents” a company is generating, their level of success in getting these granted, their reach globally to the patent agencies of different countries (the theory being that the more valuable a company considers an invention, the more broadly it will try to protect it), and the influence of their patent portfolio as indicated by its being referenced in other patent applications.   In other words… not only is the quantity  (size) of the patent portfolio important, the quality  of the portfolio is also important.   The price of entry here is 100 or more innovation patents from the most recent five years.   So both Forbes and Thomson have highly technical algorithms with undoubtedly some incredible level of precision behind them, but because they’re looking at two very different things, they arrive at two very different answers.   This dichotomy reflects a very real “shades of grey” problem the innovation industry has… how to define innovation effectiveness.   In this case, one party is asking the investors and the other is asking the engineers, and those are simply two very different views of the innovation world, neither necessarily right nor wrong, just different.   Likewise, BCG is asking business executives and Fast Company is asking consumers (and to a lesser degree, marketers).   They’re all going to get different answers.

By the same token, we can suppose that if we were to ask the folks at CB Insights about their list of the 100 most innovative companies in the world (they haven’t posted one yet), we would likely get yet a very different answer, since what they are looking at is activity in the startup, angel investing, and venture capital worlds.   Certainly their set of “rose colored glasses” would be different yet from any of these others.

This leaves us hanging and wondering… whose list is right?   Which set of lenses should we wear?   This is a widespread and universal problem… that of trying to measure “innovativeness” and “innovation effectiveness”.   Many have taken a stab at it.   In the whitepaper “Innovation Metrics: Measurement to Insight” prepared for the U.S. National Innovation Initiative (now somewhat dated), Egils Milbergs and Nicholas Vonortas lay out “first generation” indicators, which were primarily about innovation inputs, “second generation” indicators, which were about intermediate outputs, “third generation” indicators, which were based on the quantitative study of publicly available benchmarking data, and “fourth generation” indicators, which recognized the value of intangible contributors such as knowledge holdings, business networks, and innovation ecosystems that foster and support innovation.   They point out that as we move from first to fourth generation indicators, we move further away from an industrial economy viewpoint and more toward a knowledge economy viewpoint.   In their system, patent activity was considered a second generation indicator… not something to be relied upon as a good indicator of real innovation.   And they were right… patent activity itself is an antiquated method that should be ignored.   However patent activity and patent portfolio valuation are two very different things, though both deal with one’s intellectual property (portfolio valuation would fall under Milbergs’ and Vonortas’ fourth generation indicators).   This is precisely why Thomson Innovation attempts to characterize the quality  of the patent portfolio; they use its quality as a surrogate for its potential  valuation.   There continues to be strong sentiment around this, with a growing awareness of the real financial value that intangible assets such as IP holdings have.   In an incredibly excellent survey of the world of innovation entitled “What Innovation Is” (2005), Howard Smith, Chief Technology Officer in CSC’s European Group, pointed out that at that time pharmaceutical giant Pfizer had a market cap of $270 billion while holding only $20 billion worth of tangible assets like machinery, land, and buildings, the difference being made up by the intangible assets it held in the form of drug patents behind such market leading drugs as Zoloft, Zyrtec, and Norvasc.   The same is true too of most software firms… their intellectual property assets (including informal tribal knowledge) are a major constituent of their total valuation; their real property assets account for very little of it.   This being the case, one might expect a correlation between the Forbes and Thomson models, such that the lack of a correlation must lead us to believe that investor sentiment is tied more to anticipated future market activity (i.e. real product commercialization) than to the IP underpinning it, or that Thomson’s early assessment of portfolioquality  does not always mature into actual portfolio valuation.   I will leave that for the investor analysts to debate.

Ultimately, innovation effectiveness has to measure actual, real value delivered to the marketplace (customers) and the innovation–based growth that happens inside of companies as a result of that.   By this standard, both of these objective attempts are in fact poor surrogates.   Companies that generate a substantial volume of intellectual property, even high quality intellectual property, but fail to convert this into tangible commercial products and services cannot be called truly effective innovators (though they could be called great inventors).   Likewise, investors jacking up the valuation of a company because they feel warm and fuzzy about it is a highly speculative undertaking and is based on the whims of a group of people who are potentially operating under a herd mentality.   I’m certain that in 1999 many investors thought Enron was an incredibly innovative company and its valuation was affected by that sentiment.   But was that valuation real, and did that sentiment really make it innovative?   In that same year, just before the bubble burst, the same could be said about many of the young dot com companies.   So why then do Forbes and Thomson use the metrics that they do (aside from selling ads or research reports)?   The reason is mostly because the information they are based on is publicly available information and is market agnostic, meaning it can be applied across all industry sectors, allowing for the direct comparison between companies across nearly every industry and market.   But neither is a direct  measure of innovation effectiveness; both are indirect  measures.   A direct, objective measure of innovation effectiveness that is publicly available does not exist — yet.

Direct measures do exist inside of companies however (where they tend to remain locked up) and have been in widespread use for many years now.   Here, companies track metrics that are direct measures of accelerated value delivery,  and tend to be analyzed at a high level of granularity — market by market, category by category, and product by product.   Among others, these includes measures such as:

  • Percent annual revenue growth attributable to offerings launched or business models implemented within the past 60 months.
  • The difference between their own market share growth and the growth of the overall market.   This indicates additional uptake… acceleration over the baseline market velocity.   This metric is not fully reliable however, as it may improve because a major competitor moved backward (product recalls, quality and delivery issues, poor user reviews, etc.), or solely because a sales force was amped up, rather than because the company had true innovation-based growth.
  • Customer surveys around perceptions of how innovative the company is (this should bear some correlation to the above metrics).
While these metrics can be very insightful, they have two major shortcomings.   First, they are typically only reported internally within companies and are not available externally.   Second, there is not a universally accepted method for quantifying them consistently across companies (I have seen wide variation over the years).   This makes it impossible to compile such information into a form that can be used to compare companies to one another, leaving us empty–handed and forced to work with what is publicly available, as Forbes and Thomson have attempted to do.

I propose that the solution to this dilemma is for industry to come together and define a uniform set of metrics for innovation effectiveness (or innovation-based business growth) that can be applied — and reported — consistently across every company in every industry and every market, including those omitted by both Forbes and Thomson (e.g. an energy company that leverages trade secrets to deliver substantially greater value to the market than any other energy company, winning substantial market share and revenues as a result).   I would give these metrics a formal–sounding name such as the Universal Measures of Value Delivery Acceleration  (UMVDA), so that politicians, economists, academicians, and investors would find them compelling and encourage businesses to use them (the rest of us can just call them “innovativeness”).   These measures would reflect the new value that markets perceive they are receiving from companies, as voted for in their spending dollars.

With such a tool in hand, companies who wish to be thought of as leading innovators could then compile their numbers and report them alongside their other statistics, such as those dealing with corporate responsibility and sustainability.   These measures — representing the true capitalization of accelerated value delivery — could then be used as the basis for a fair and objective apples–to–apples comparison between all companies.   Then the world would know who its 100 most innovative companies really are.

In the meantime, how can we use what is out there?   It would be interesting to look at the next 200 companies on both Forbes’ and Thomson’s lists, and from these lists I suspect we can find a few companies that show up on both lists.   That aside, we have cross-referenced what is published in these four lists and from that we have identified 19 companies that show up in at least two of the lists, and five companies that show up in three of the four lists.   Who are those five companies?   They are Amazon, Apple, GE, Google, and Nike.   Maybe these really are the most innovative companies in the world.   And maybe those subjective perceptions we started with really do count for something after all.

суббота, 17 октября 2020 г.

Target Operating Model Optimisation & Redesign

 

Target Operating Model Optimisation and Redesign – A holistic transformational approach leads to an alignment of business and technology vision and strategy tailored in all dimensions to meet future requirements and best fit on strategic outlook and market change. 


Typical client symptoms

  • Lack of clear strategy – “We have done it always like that…”- unclear business strategy and goals make it difficult to link business strategy with actionable changes to the operating model

  • Difficulty articulating the future state – undefined customer and operational practices and interactions (silo products/region centric solutions) imped productivity and result in loss of talent

  • Complexity of IT architecture – poor understanding how to implement new IT solutions alongside legacy systems hamper flexible deployment of innovative product and services

  • Competing priorities and middle management resistance – competing priorities combined with limited resources and resistance to new ways of working and thinking undermine organization ability to drive innovation and change


What we do


Assess – articulate, define/refine strategy vision, diagnose operating model effectiveness and outline the gaps in capability to reach the TOM

Design – define a) designing principles how the operating model will be developed and set the key measures for success; and b) how the organization will operate and capabilities it will require in line with the strategic intent along the following dimensions (customers, channels, products/services, processes, IT, organization, people and location)

Build – refine business case (quantify change in terms of costs, benefits and risks), implementation roadmap, headcount requirements, organization structure, job design and competencies.

Implement – set roadmap defining timelines, roles, and actions to implement TOM, develop and monitor dashboard of key performance indicators to assist management with refining the new operating environment.

Depending on strategic context, organisational complexity (e.g. single country vs. multi-country), stakeholder participation and availabilities a typical TOM redesign and optimisation engagement varies between 8 weeks and up to 5 months to provide the desired target model and a sustainable roadmap for transition.



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