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воскресенье, 16 октября 2016 г.

Complexity and Organizational Design


I’m staying with the theme of Organizational Design of my last few posts related to strategy frameworks. The issue of complexity is an important one in organizational design considerations. Often one of the goals of an organizational design project is to “simplify” structures and process so that people can do their jobs more effectively. But you can’t just eliminate all complexity and oversimplify everything. Complexity is a fact of life, and often the better question to ask is how it can be managed most effectively.
The framework below, based on a McKinsey Quarterly article (link), describes some of these trade-offs. It distinguishes between:
  • Institutional complexity, which is driven by the number of links to and interfaces with others within and outside the organization. The degree of institutional complexity is largely influenced by strategic choices and the external (e.g. regulatory) environment.
  • Individual complexity, which describes the way managers and employees perceived their jobs, whether or not they have a limited and easy, or extensive and complicated set of tasks to accomplish. The degree of individual complexity is driven by organizational and operational choices.
The two types of complexity are closely linked, and there is usually a significant trade-off. Companies tend to focus a lot of institutional complexity, but designing a simple org chart may result in employees jobs becoming more complex, as they have to deal with more interfaces.
To use an analogy: An airport is a system with low institutional complexity (only a few runways to use), but high degrees of individual complexity, since many critical decisions are concentrated in the hands of a few expert air traffic controllers. A road system is the opposite: High institutional complexity, with many roads and many different ways to get from A to B. But low individual complexity, with fairly simple decisions being made by a large, distributed group of drivers.
Key influencing factors:
Strategic choices:
  • Number of products and services
  • Number of geographies covered
  • Sources of competitive differentiation
External context:
  • Regulatory environment
  • Intensity of competition
  • Speed of competitive evolution and market changes
Organizational choices:
  • Structural design
  • Role definitions
  • Process refinement
  • Capabilities
  • Culture
Operational choices:
  • Complexity of the value chain (manufacturing, R&D, etc.)
  • Use of technology
The authors of the McKinsey article state that their research highlighted a few factors that are critical to managing individual complexity. Among them were issues like:
  • Effective organizational design at the individual level. A company may have a complex matrix structure, but still minimize organizational complexity at the individual level by making sure that activities are not redundant, that targets are clear, etc.
  • Well aligned processes. Not surprisingly, processes have a big impact on individual’s job complexity.
  • Strong capabilities: Building both basic management skills (functional skills, change management skills, etc.), but also the ability to deal effectively with ambiguity had a strong influence on people’s perceived individual job complexity.

суббота, 16 апреля 2016 г.

BCG Classics Revisited: The Experience Curve

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by Martin ReevesGeorge Stalk, and Filippo L. Scognamiglio Pasini


To mark The Boston Consulting Group’s fiftieth anniversary, BCG’s Strategy Institute is taking a fresh look at some of BCG’s classic thinking on strategy to explore its relevance to today’s business environment. This second in a planned series of articles examines the experience curve, an idea developed by BCG in the mid-1960s about the relationship between production experience and cost.

  • The experience curve theory, centered on the relationship between production experience and costs, proved a valuable predictor of competitive dynamics through the 1970s.
  • The theory remains valid today, especially in industries that are relatively stable, cost-sensitive, competitive, and production-intensive.

  • Many companies today, however, need to develop an additional type of experience—experience inshaping demand—to build and sustain competitive advantage.

The experience curve is one of BCG’s signature concepts and arguably one of its best known. The theory, which had its genesis in a cost analysis that BCG performed for a major semiconductor manufacturer in 1966, held that a company’s unit production costs would fall by a predictable amount—typically 20 to 30 percent in real terms—for each doubling of “experience,” or accumulated production volume. The implications of this relationship for business, argued BCG’s founder, Bruce Henderson, were significant.  In particular, he said, it suggested that market share leadership could confer a decisive competitive edge, because a company with dominant share could more rapidly accumulate valuable experience and thus achieve a self-perpetuating cost advantage over its rivals.
The experience curve theory proved a valuable descriptor and predictor of competitive dynamics across much of the business landscape through the 1970s, providing a sound guide for investment and pricing decisions and an invaluable tool for strategists. Is the idea applicable to today’s environment? Yes, but in some industries it is no longer sufficient by itself as a blueprint for competitive advantage. In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, when the general business environment was relatively stable and new-product introduction relatively infrequent, today’s business climate is characterized by higher volatility, less stable industry structures, and frequent product launches in response to rapidly changing technologies and tastes.
Experience of the type addressed by the experience curve is still necessary—often critically so, depending on the industry. But we argue that most companies today need an additional kind of experience if they hope to create and sustain competitive advantage.
Two Types of Experience
The type of experience that the classic experience curve refers to—the ability to produce existing products more cheaply and deliver them to an ever-wider audience—can be considered experience in fulfilling demand. This type of experience remains very important in many industries, especially those that are relatively stable, cost-sensitive, competitive, and production-intensive.
Hard-disk drives, for example, showed a cost decline of about 50 percent for each doubling of accumulated production from 1980 through 2002, bringing the average cost per gigabyte from $80,000 in 1984 to $6 in 2001. Laser diodes showed a similarly steep cost decline of 40–45 percent with each doubling of volume, with prices decreasing from the roughly $30,000 of fiber amplifiers in the early 1980s to $1.30 for 0.8-micrometer CD lasers (unpackaged) in 1999. But to win in today’s environment, many companies also need experience in shaping demand, or creating demand for new products and services.
Exhibit 1 is a visual representation of the two types. Experience in fulfilling demand is represented as the classic experience curve: it shows a reduction in costs as a function of cumulative volume (which is a straight line in a log-log scale). Experience in shaping demand is represented as repeated “jumps” across successive experience curves, representing a company’s ability to move from product generation to product generation repeatedly and successfully. The relationship between the two types of experience might also be visualized as an endless version of the popular board game Snakes and Ladders. To maintain competitive advantage, companies have to both “slide down snakes” (that is, fulfill demand) and “climb ladders” (that is, shape demand). The relative emphasis on each depends on a company’s particular circumstances.

The two types of experience are inherently different, as is the way they are accumulated and the benefits they confer. Experience at fulfilling demand is acquired through a logical deductive process: capture your cost data, analyze them, determine opportunities for improvement, implement changes, iterate. The main features of the learning process are repetition and incremental improvement, both explicit and implicit. Experience at shaping demand, in contrast, is acquired through an inductive process: sample consumer behaviors, formulate a hypothesis on unmet needs or imagine the possibilities permitted by new technologies, test the hypothesis with a new offering, shut down the test or expand it based on empirical results, formulate new hypotheses based on the latest empirical results, repeat.
It should be noted that neither experience type, by itself, has ever been sufficient for long-term competitive advantage. Both have always been necessary. What has changed recently is that the required speed of cycling between the two has increased dramatically. We refer to this ability to develop and leverage both existing and new product knowledge concurrently, or to switch between them effectively over time, as ambidexterity.
Experience in Shaping Demand in Practice
Experience in shaping demand—which can be gauged by a company’s product-introduction “clock speed” or by the percentage of sales derived from new products or services—can be a powerful competitive weapon, particularly when paired effectively with experience in fulfilling demand. It can be seen as a second-order type of experience, one that comes from sharing experience across different areas and learning how to learn new things. It includes the ability to “forget” lessons from the past when such information has become obsolete and is no longer relevant to the latest product generation. This type of experience can be disruptive not only because it involves innovation but also because being at a disadvantage on an earlier product generation can quickly be overturned by shaping demand to get a head start on the next experience curve.
We can illustrate the power of demand-shaping experience, and how the past and present of the experience curve interweave, by taking a contemporary look at the industry that gave birth to the experience curve.
ARM Holdings is a leading semiconductor player, with particular strength in the design of low-power microprocessors. The company itself is not a manufacturer; rather, it designs the underlying technologies and leaves manufacture to its partners. By focusing on shaping demand through its innovative designs and leveraging its partners’ expertise in fulfilling demand, thus avoiding the need to develop such experience itself, ARM has created a compelling recipe for success. Devices based on ARM’s technology now account for 95 percent of the fast-growing smartphone market. ARM also boasted an impressive annualized total shareholder return (TSR) of 28 percent for the seven years through 2011. ARM’s partners, too, have benefited from this approach, as evidenced by their strong product shipments and TSR: Qualcomm’s annualized TSR for the same period was 5 percent, for example, also above the industry median of –6 percent for the same period.
Facebook successfully shaped demand for its services by continually improving users’ experience and doing so faster than rival Myspace. (See Exhibit 2.) To build demand-shaping experience, Facebook released new software weekly and experimented with new technologies and features such as live chat, photo albums, and a third-party app-developer interface. These efforts allowed Facebook to gain a more thorough understanding of users’ needs and desires and respond to them with accelerated new-product generation, translating into a swelling userbase and eventually also an improved cost position.

Netflix twice radically shaped demand by improving the convenience of a service. Its promise of convenient and inexpensive DVDs by mail (with no late fees or hassles with pickup and drop-off) successfully shaped the demand for home video. Netflix succeeded again when it introduced streaming (which added the benefits of assured and instant availability), even though the offering was obviously going to cannibalize the company’s DVD-by-mail business. Netflix realized that the DVD-by-mail offering was vulnerable to streaming technology, regardless of which company launched the service first. The company’s early move to shape demand forced its major competitors to react to the initial consumer expectations that Netflix had set, giving Netflix a substantial advantage.
These companies’ focus on excellence in both shaping and fulfilling demand allowed them to thrive, often overtaking their established competitors. This is a phenomenon that the traditional experience curve cannot explain.
Sustaining Competitive Advantage Both Within and Across Product Generations
Solidifying your long-term competitive advantage in today’s environment requires asking yourself a series of questions about excellence in both shaping and fulfilling demand.
What balance of experience in fulfilling and shaping demand is required in our industry? In some industries, experience in fulfilling demand remains critical.  Other industries, usually younger ones, will benefit more from experience in shaping demand. Determine what your industry requires. Remember that, as illustrated by ARM Holdings, experience can be sourced externally under certain circumstances.
Do we have the right disciplines and capabilities to develop and leverage experience in fulfilling demand? Build scale and defend the market share of your established products. Learn through repetition and incremental improvement, both explicit and implicit, to further reduce costs.
Do we have the right disciplines and capabilities to develop and leverage experience in shaping demand? Unlink the development of new products and services from the production and management of existing ones. Empower individuals to experiment. Foster an appetite for risk with incentives that reward success; punish failure only if it arises from irresponsibility. Accelerate the product life cycle and plan the retirement of products as well as their launch. Create advantage by better understanding and shaping demand.
Do we have the right metrics in place for both types of experience? Ensure that you can gauge your prowess in building and leveraging both types of experience. Compare the results with those of your direct and indirect competitors. Examine your relative cost positions and demand-shaping clock speed and use them as your firm’s composite measure of success.
Do we have the right approach to balancing and combining experience types?Shaping demand and fulfilling demand are different in nature, and experience is acquired and leveraged through different, sometimes conflicting, means. In our above-referenced BCG Perspectives publication on ambidexterity, we presented four different approaches to striking an optimal balance: separation, switching, self-organizing, and external ecosystem. The right approach for your company will be determined by the dynamism and diversity of your specific industry environment.



As consumer tastes and product generations change ever more rapidly, experience in fulfilling demand alone is no longer sufficient to sustain a competitively advantaged position. An additional type of experience—experience in shaping demand—becomes necessary as well. This experience must be acquired through new and different means that can sometimes be in direct conflict with the current means your organization employs to acquire experience. But failure to do so can exact a significant toll, ranging from the loss of a leadership position to outright business failure.
The ability to skillfully build and leverage both types of experiences concurrently—ambidexterity—is the present-day hallmark of truly exceptional management. It is a rare attribute but a highly valuable one, one that can be developed if a company follows the right approach.

вторник, 29 декабря 2015 г.

Three Growth Horizons

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The Three Growth Horizons concept was popularized in a book by a number of McKinsey consultants (Mehrdad Baghai and others) in 1996. The book was based on a study of 40 growth companies, where the authors tried to identify how these successful companies approach and implement growth strategies. The key pattern that the authors identified is one of a step-by-step approach, a “staircase of initiatives.” Companies certainly keep an eye on the longer term strategy, but also simultaneously manage the near term. Each time a short term target is reached, a new capability is developed, a small acquisition is integrated, successful growers look at this as a platform for the next step. This may be a platform to continue to execute towards a strategic goal that had been set in the past. But it may also be a stage where new opportunities arise, that the company may not have been aware of before.
One of the key prerequisites of this approach is the simultaneous management of different time horizons. The core business needs to be defended and extended – this is the base where successful companies “earn the right to grow.” In the second growth horizon are a select number of opportunities that typically already have a significant size to have a positive impact on the overall top line of the company. In the third growth horizon are seeds that the company plants. Some of them may work out, some of them may not. Many of them are likely to be small, entrepreneurial ventures.

We used this concept recently in a growth strategy workshop with the division of a services firm. The client had an important core business which was quite cyclical. A number of other, smaller business lines existed, and the executive team struggled to really understand which ones to focus on. The three growth horizons concept proved quite helpful to the team. It allowed them to classify “grow” and “seed” business lines, and differentiate expectations, investments, and action plans accordingly. Not all growth opportunities are created equal!

суббота, 17 октября 2015 г.

The 2015 M&A Report




Increasing Returns with M&A

by Jens KengelbachGeorg KeienburgKetil GjerstadJesper Nielsen Decker Walker, and Stuart Walker

The indications of recovery early in 2014 proved prescient. The full year saw the global number of M&A deals and total deal value return almost to 2005 and 2006 levels, which were surpassed only by the heights achieved prior to the dot-com collapse in 2000 and the financial crisis in 2008. M&A activity has been broad based geographically—with double-digit increases in all the major regions of the world—and has taken place across a wide range of industries. The deals in each industry, however, are rooted in that sector’s or segment’s particular dynamics. The long-awaited recovery appears to have legs—deal volume and deal value have continued to show strength in the first two quarters of 2015—although it bears remembering that M&A cycles are getting shorter over time, and the drop in deal value from the past two market peaks was severe—more than 80 percent within 18 months of the high points in 2000 and 2007.
In The Boston Consulting Group's 2014 M&A report, we discussed how the market was being fueled in part by a continuing rise in divestitures, which represent a powerful strategy for unlocking value and improving performance by focusing on core operations. (See “Creating Shareholder Value with Divestitures,” BCG article, September 2014.) Divestitures continue to be a vital source of M&A activity. But as economies around the world improve, corporate cash reserves grow, and financing remains cheap, the question in the boardroom becomes, “How do we spend the money?”
For CEOs in high-growth sectors, such as technology, there are plenty of opportunities to invest in organic expansion through new products, markets, and locations. For companies in more mature industries—energy, health care, consumer goods, and financial services, to name a few—the outlook for internal growth is often less robust. One answer to the spending question lies in channeling cash reserves and inexpensive financing into growth through acquisition. But even as M&A volumes soar, big questions linger around the ability of companies to generate value by buying their way to growth. (See “Should Companies Buy Growth?,” BCG article, October 2015.)

Acquiring revenue is certainly one way to grow the top line, but economists, M&A professionals, and other experts frequently debate how successful acquisitions are at delivering bottom-line growth—and especially growth in value for shareholders. Our own research, based on BCG’s proprietary global database of more than 40,000 M&A transactions since 1990, shows that the results vary widely and depend on a range of factors, including industry, market dynamics, metrics measured, time frame, and an individual company’s own history and experience with making and integrating acquisitions. (See “From Acquiring Growth to Growing Value,” BCG article, October 2015.)
The M&A Recovery Picks Up Pace
After all the hopeful signs evidenced in 2013, last year delivered: 2014 was a banner year for M&A. Total transaction value jumped more than 20 percent to almost $2 trillion, the recovery took in a wide range of industries and players, and the rising number of deals in each successive quarter established a fast-paced momentum that has continued in 2015. (See Exhibit 1.) Total deal value in just the first half of this year reached 65 percent of total deal value in all of 2014, and there have been multiple huge and high-impact deals announced in such industries as energy, media, health care, consumer products, and financial services.


M&A activity has been broad based geographically, with all the major regions of the world showing double-digit increases in 2014 over 2013. Megadeals (deals with values of more than $10 billion), which we highlighted in last year’s report as a reemerging trend, played a big role in the 2014 results. There were 14 such deals completed in 2014, with an aggregate value of $262.3 billion or 14 percent of the total deal value for the year.
North America was the most active M&A market, racking up nearly $1 trillion in total deal value—an 18 percent increase over 2013. Low interest rates, which helped propel rising valuations, as well as ample corporate and private-equity cash reserves, all fueled deal volume. Private-equity players were both big buyers and big sellers as markets were receptive to both trade sales and IPOs. Psychology also played a role as some companies feared losing opportunities if they did not move—a dangerous development, in our judgment, as similar dynamics helped inflate the 2000 and 2007 M&A bubbles prior to their bursting. Other companies continued to prune nonstrategic operations in order to capture rising asset values.
Asia-Pacific recorded the biggest increase in deal value in 2014 over 2013—a 50 percent jump to almost $330 billion. Megadeals contributed substantially; five megadeals accounted for more than a quarter of the overall value of all Asia-Pacific deals. China was especially active, accounting for 46 percent of total deal value and 30 percent of total deal volume in the Asia-Pacific region in 2014.
Europe and the rest of the world also showed strong growth as improving economies provided corporate and private-equity buyers with the confidence to pursue large transactions on a level not seen in recent years. As elsewhere, the number of megadeals and deal values soared. Strategic priorities included geographic expansion (especially for buyers from outside Europe eyeing prime European assets), the search for scale and growth, and industry consolidation. Activity might have been even higher but geopolitical tensions surrounding Ukraine cooled activity in Eastern Europe.
Three Global Trends
While the increase in deal making was broad based across sectors and industries, three global trends propelled much of the activity: hot high-tech markets, companies seeking to adapt to a “new normal” in their sector or industry, and consolidation along with the hunt for innovation. (See Exhibit 2.)


Hot High-Tech Markets. The superheated high-tech sector saw the largest increase in deal value and the biggest deal premiums. Technology companies are on the lookout for portfolio add-ons to expand their capabilities and customer base, and some nontech companies are seeking diversification in order to participate in the high-tech growth story. Google, for example, completed more than 30 deals in 2014 involving a wide range of technologies—including Nest Labs (which makes in-home HVAC controls) and Skybox Imaging (a satellite-imaging company). Daimler expanded its technology capabilities with the purchase of Intelligent Apps (parent company of mytaxi) and RideScout, which compete with Uber in the fast-growing—and sometimes controversial—ride-sharing business. Takeover premiums as high as 31 percent—on top of already healthy share-price valuations—clearly showed high tech to be the hottest M&A market in 2014, with growth as its common theme.
Adapting to a New Normal. In the energy and financial services sectors, companies are using M&A to adapt to changed environments. The large and sudden fall in oil prices—driven by big increases in world supply and the battle between Persian Gulf producers and nimble new North American shale and fracking companies—has caused a sea change in the industry. Energy companies need to reposition themselves in a new marketplace, defined by oil in the $40- to $70-a-barrel price range, rather than $100 to $120 a barrel. The November 2014 Halliburton–Baker Hughes deal is one example in oil field services. Repsol’s acquisition of Talisman Energy and Encana’s acquisition of Athlon Energy are examples of upstream oil companies expanding their production base.
At the same time, many power companies continue to struggle, post-Fukushima, to find alternatives for their highly profitable nuclear-power business. Two acquisitions valued at more than $1 billion each in Asia point to the rising importance of renewable energy sources. In India, JSW Energy acquired two hydroelectric projects in a $1.6 billion deal. While in China, Wuhan Kaidi Electric Power acquired 87 biomass power stations, five wind-power projects, and three hydroelectric installations for $1.1 billion.
As oil prices have dropped, private-equity firms—which have long been enthusiastic about the energy sector—seem undeterred by mixed results from their energy investments and are becoming increasingly active. We expect deal activity to continue to be strong but premiums to remain muted as they were in 2014. M&A is as much a tool for survival as expansion in the current environment.
A similar shift to changed circumstances is taking place in financial services, thanks to the extended period of low interest rates following the 2008 financial crisis. Banks and other financial-services institutions are using M&A to strategically expand their footprints where they see opportunity. For example, Swedbank acquired Sparbanken Öresund to form Sweden’s largest savings bank. Multiple acquirers in the U.S. snapped up regional banks over the course of 2014. At the same time, big players such as General Electric decided to divest their financial-services operations. While these types of deals fueled the M&A pipeline with volume growth of 31 percent in 2014 over 2013, average acquisition premiums dropped by 19 percent.
Consolidation and the Hunt for Innovation. In health care, consumer goods, and media, entertainment, and telecommunications, many companies are on a hunt for innovation through acquisition, while others seek scale and enhanced market position. Within the pharmaceutical industry, M&A has become a form of what might be called externalized R&D—companies acquiring smaller enterprises with a promising new product or process early in the development stage. At the same time, large-cap players looking to generate sales synergies are acquiring market-ready innovations that are in an advanced state. In August 2014, for example, Roche agreed to acquire InterMune, a biotech company that develops drug treatments for pulmonary and fibrotic diseases, for $8.3 billion. AbbVie’s $21 billion agreement to buy Pharmacyclics, Pfizer’s $17 billion acquisition of Hospira, and Valeant’s $11 billion deal to acquire Salix propelled these trends into 2015 with a full head of steam behind them.
Deals such as these are often big, costly, and complex. But large players need products to feed their global sales networks, and their networks can better market established drugs than the sales networks of the smaller companies that develop the drugs. There is significant upside for the acquirer, despite high prices and premiums.
In the mature and competitive consumer and retail sector, acquirers such as Suntory (which acquired Beam), Tyson Foods (which acquired Hillshire Brands), Anheuser-Busch InBev (which acquired Oriental Brewery) and Dollar Tree (which acquired Family Dollar Stores) clearly believe that buying established brands is both less expensive and more certain than trying to build them, both at home and internationally. Similarly, media and telecom companies such as Charter Communications and Numericable sought scale and market share with bids for Time Warner Cable and Bouygues Telecom, respectively.
The Year That Could Have Been Much Bigger
The year 2014 might be remembered as much for the deals that didn’t happen as for those that did. Unsuccessful or terminated takeover attempts reached their highest level since 1999. (See Exhibit 3.) Almost a quarter of announced deal value failed to reach consummation, owing primarily to unsuccessful megadeals, such as 21st Century Fox’s bid for Time Warner Inc. and Pfizer’s offer to acquire AstraZeneca. In fact, three offers aggregating almost $300 billion—some 15 percent of the year’s total deal value—were withdrawn or terminated.



The high failure rate may be rooted in the fact that megadeals are inherently more complex and difficult to complete than smaller transactions. Their size means they often reshape industry landscapes, which can engender both strong opposition from the target’s management and greater scrutiny from regulatory authorities. The managements and boards of both Time Warner Inc. and AstraZeneca refused to be led to the altar. Antitrust concerns were raised by Time Warner Cable’s management in the face of the Charter bid. And the public and political outcry over inversion deals played a big role in the demise of two failed pharmaceutical-industry bids (Pfizer for AstraZeneca and AbbVie for Shire). Meanwhile, many smaller deals moved forward to completion without opposition or objection.
The irony is that, in 2014 at least, investors might well have missed opportunities to profit on both ends of these transactions. With average excess returns of 0.6 percent for acquirers and returns of 19 percent (at announcement) for targets, 2014 was one of those rare years in which M&A resulted in net gains for shareholders of both acquirers and targets. Long-term historical averages show the benefits of M&A accruing heavily to the target company’s shareholders, while the acquirer’s shareholders, more often than not, lose money. (See Exhibit 4.) Last year, we reported that 60 percent of respondents to BCG’s 2014 Investor Survey favored a more aggressive approach to M&A, and investors’ responses to deals since then have borne out their enthusiasm.



Will Deal Volume and Value Continue to Rise?
Median enterprise-value-to-EBITDA multiples have been on the increase since 2009. They stood at 12.3 in 2014, above the 25-year average of 12.0, and are closing in on 2007 record territory of 13.7. Acquirers are buying at lofty price levels. At the same time, average takeover premiums of 27.7 percent in 2014 are still about 4 percentage points below their longtime average of 32 percent and well below the mid- to upper-30 percent premiums that have been paid in recent years. This suggests that the current M&A bull market might have additional room to run, although one has to question whether the pace of activity in the first half of 2015 is sustainable. (See Exhibit 5.)




Other factors point to continued strength. Interest rates remain low, credit is readily available, and buyers are willing to borrow. The debt-to-equity levels of the leveraged buyout deals today are similar to those before the financial crisis; the average leveraged buyout in 2014 included 36.9 percent equity, slightly above the 35.6 percent equity in 2013. “Covenant lite” loan activity in 2014 also continued at record levels. The incidence of these loans, which generally do not involve any maintenance covenants, indicates growing investor appetite in the leveraged-loan market, making borrowing even more attractive for private-equity deals.
In addition, many market participants have substantial and growing resources that they need to put to work. The number of private-equity deals rose 16 percent in 2014 to a record 4,590, while the value of these transactions jumped 18 percent to almost $550 billion—both big increases compared with the past few years. Private-equity transactions represented almost 20 percent of the total number of M&A deals in 2014, up from 17.5 percent in 2013. Cash available in private-equity funds reached $462 billion in February 2015, an increase of 7 percent over year-end 2013 and approaching record levels. (See Exhibit 6.)



As always, a big challenge for private-equity investors is finding attractive acquisition opportunities. Rising asset valuations cut into potential returns, and corporate owners have become much better in recent years at applying private-equity-like discipline and practices across their operations, leaving less room for new owners to make improvements. That said, as we pointed out last year, divestitures have been on the rise as a means of creating value on both sides of M&A transactions. In industries undergoing transition, such as energy and financial services, the divestitures represented 57 percent and 46 percent, respectively, of all deals in 2014. Private-equity firms are frequent buyers of such assets.
For corporate acquirers, several key indicators would also point to further deal activity. Cash reserves remain at record highs, and public-company investors, like their private-equity counterparts, become impatient when money is not put to productive use. Companies are not raising dividends—both gross payouts and payout ratios have been flat or declining in recent years. Corporate capital expenditures, in both dollar terms and as a percentage of sales, have also plateaued. (See Exhibit 7.) M&A is one of a few remaining strategic alternatives, especially for companies seeking growth.



The search for growth—the subject we explore elsewhere in this year’s report—may be the pivotal imperative. Organic growth is hard to come by when the rates of projected economic expansion are low in most markets and many sectors. This will cause some, perhaps many, managements to cast their eyes externally—toward others in their industries or to adjacent business sectors. This can be a smart strategy. But as we show in the companion articles, acquiring one’s way to growth is a complex undertaking that is by no means assured of achieving its goals. Careful planning, precise execution, and a hard-nosed assessment of the capital markets are all prerequisites for success.

Authors and Acknowledgments
To Contact the Authors
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to Stefanie Siegmund, Alexander Frank, and Eugene Khoo for their insights and their support on the research and content development of this report. They would also like to thank Boryana Hintermair for coordinating the publication of this report, David Duffy for his assistance in writing the report, and Katherine Andrews, Gary Callahan, Angela DiBattista, Kim Friedman, Abby Garland, Pamela Gilfond, and Sara Strassenreiter for their help with its editing, design, and production.


https://on.bcg.com/2Q8Fi5h

четверг, 1 октября 2015 г.

Grow from Your Strengths

The only sustainable way to capture new opportunities is to remain true to what your company does best.

Illustration by Robert Samuel Hanson
Growth is the ultimate test of business vitality, yet questions about it haunt business leaders. How much will we grow this year, and beyond? How much growth do we need? What kind of growth do we need? How should we balance revenue growth against margin improvement? How far afield from our current business should we look for new customers? Once we know where we want to be, how do we get there?
The best recipe for sustained, profitable growth is simple in its basic concept. It requires a capabilities-driven approach — making the most of what you already do well — that goes well beyond traditional market-back approaches, which try to deliver whatever the outside world seems to need.
It is also devilishly difficult in its details, because it assumes you will use any means at your disposal to achieve your goal. There need be no trade-off between current markets and adjacent markets, or between organic methods (such as marketing and innovation) and inorganic methods (such as mergers and acquisitions). You can and should blend all of these, ideally in a dynamic and fast-paced way, as long as they are aligned with the proficiency and advantages you already have.
Thus, before you pursue growth directly, you should have in place the three elements of a clearly defined, coherent strategy: (1) a value proposition that resonates with customers, supported by (2) a system of distinctive capabilities, combined in a way that competitors can’t match, with (3) a portfolio of products and services that are all aligned to the first two elements. You must also be able to deliver on that value proposition, translating concept into competitive position with a viable, sustainable business model that generates profits and cash flow.
You can grow profitably and sustainably only from a position of strength. If your enterprise is struggling to maintain its economic lifelines, then foundational work on strategy, organization, cost optimization, or other factors is needed before any new growth strategy can succeed. Companies that enter new businesses to escape a weak position generally become weaker still, because they move into markets where they lack the capabilities needed to succeed.
Typewriter maker Smith Corona, for example, understood the needs of students and self-employed typists better than anyone else; this helped the company develop a successful line of word-processing computers in the 1980s. But the company couldn’t sustain that business, because its efforts to expand into office supply distribution, kitchen appliances, daisy-wheel printers, and paints had left it without the resources to compete against other types of personal computers. Blockbuster Video sought to protect itself from disruption in the early 2000s by buying Circuit City — an effort to create synergy from two weakened businesses without a clear logic for creating value together.
Let’s say you have that position of strength to start from: a capabilities-driven strategy and the wherewithal to exploit it. From there, you can chart a course toward sustainable and profitable expansion by combining four approaches to growth:
1. In-market leverage: seeking out new growth opportunities among your existing customers in your core market as currently defined.
2. Near-market expansion: pursuing opportunities in unfamiliar sectors or with new products. This approach is also known as expansion through adjacencies.
3. Disruptive growth: responding to dramatic change with entirely new business models and capabilities if and as appropriate. Though important at times, this is rarer than many businesspeople think and should be undertaken only if you have a clear idea of how to link your existing capabilities system to the new one you will need.
4. Capability development: building distinctive organizational proficiency in a way that supports the other three forms of growth. This can be accomplished through a variety of means, including M&A, innovation, and operations improvements.
All four of these topics may seem familiar; they have been discussed over the years at most companies. But the linkages among them are often overlooked. By strengthening those linkages, your company can enter into a cycle of ongoing self-renewal. Most companies exhibiting consistent long-term growth — Amazon, Apple, Danaher, Disney, General Electric, Hyundai, Nike, Novo Nordisk, Oracle, Starbucks, and Walmart among them — have followed and continue to follow this path.

Headroom for Growth

Companies frequently overlook the growth opportunities that are right in front of them. Sometimes they are tempted by attractive-looking opportunities in other markets, or lured by the idea of diversification into other businesses. Sometimes, they simply haven’t spent enough time trying to imagine how their approach in an existing market could be changed to unlock additional growth. The answer lies in finding headroom: potential new business in an existing market.
The headroom for in-market leverage is the customer revenue a company could have beyond its current business, minus that which it is unlikely to get. For example, some fast-food restaurant chains have increased their revenues by selling premium coffee, espresso, and other specialty drinks to their regular breakfast or lunch customers, rather than ceding that business to Starbucks or Dunkin’ Donuts. Their headroom is the total potential premium coffee drink sales, minus the revenue from people who are unlikely to switch to them. Meanwhile, coffee retailers have added more meals to build headroom at the expense of the fast-food chains. Two food and drink businesses that were originally very different have thus evolved into competitors.
Similarly, some cable and telecommunications companies are finding headroom in their current customer base. They are shifting from being TV or telephone service providers to becoming comprehensive sources of digital, information, and value-added services (by offering home control systems, for example). Their investments in broadband lines, stretching into customers’ homes and offices, and their monthly interactions with a broad consumer base (developed over years of being regulated monopolies) give them a platform for this in-market leverage that is very hard for other companies to compete with. To be sure, these new businesses require strong capabilities in customer acquisition and service, in an industry that has often been accused of ignoring consumer complaints. But some cable and telecom providers, such as AT&T, Verizon, and Cox Communications, are now developing these capabilities to help them enter new lines of business.
Determining the size of your headroom in existing markets is a three-step process. First, find gaps between what other companies in the market offer and what customers need, and devise a way to close those “needs–offer” gaps with new or better offers. Second, identify the factors (such as features, incentives, or messaging) that would lead customers to switch to your new product or service. Finally, redeploy, leverage, and improve your capabilities — or, in some cases, add new ones — to close the gap and propel your customers to switch.
Needs–offer gaps can be found in any market. Enormous opportunities for in-market leverage are often hiding in plain sight, accessible to those who can look with fresh eyes at existing customers. One large pharmaceutical company expanded sales by identifying patients who were not taking their medications as frequently as prescribed, and then encouraging them to do so. Video game producers sell additional apps or special in-game bonuses to customers already playing their games. Manufacturers have successfully targeted customers who want more quality at an affordable price (such as those who seek out reviews of more durable appliances), or who want access to features currently available only to top-tier customers (such as smartphone purchasers seeking better-quality built-in cameras). Regional banks have offered customers access to credit with more engagement than global financial institutions could offer.
The levers available to close a needs–offer gap include adding or redeploying capabilities. For example, in retail, making incremental improvements in assortment and packaging, increasing access via a new distribution channel, or simply upgrading the customer experience in a way that outpaces competitors’ offerings. Amazon’s Prime membership is a good example. It doesn’t change any of the products Amazon sells, but it offers free two-day shipping on all purchases in return for an annual fixed fee, further leveraging Amazon’s distinctive supply chain capabilities.

Near-Market Opportunities

When companies think about growth, they often start by looking for “adjacencies” (new nearby markets to enter) that stand out primarily for their market potential. But by rushing to the most seemingly attractive opportunities — the places with hot new technologies or burgeoning consumer populations — they risk diversifying past the point of no return, just as Blockbuster and Smith Corona did. But those high-growth opportunities have probably risen up in response to another company’s successful capabilities play, which will be very hard for another company to compete against.
A better approach is to look for opportunities where you can leverage your own distinctive capabilities, find new customers for your existing products or services, or apply your strengths to new offerings. Begin with a thorough assessment of your own capabilities and their relevance for near-market opportunities. A capability is relevant because either it creates a distinctive economic advantage, such as eliminating costs, or it creates a customer-acquisition advantage, helping you capture prospective purchasers. If you don’t see that direct relevance, be cautious. Some apparent advantages, such as the ability to offer customers a single bundled source for purchases used together, won’t necessarily create real synergies. Summer barbecues may involve the purchase of grills, food, and charcoal briquettes or propane, but it’s hard to imagine a manufacturer in one of these sectors expanding successfully to the others, because of the disparate capabilities required for them.
In your assessment, give yourself credit for non-obvious strengths that will help you grow. For example, you may have overlooked capabilities you can apply in your operations infrastructure — your sales force, financial back office, or IT system — or your customer insights and logistics network. American Express had exactly this type of asset in its loyalty program, which it originally built to enhance its core business, and then extended into a platform that enabled other companies to offer similar services.
When you seek growth in near markets, be wary of stretching your capabilities system so far that the linkage breaks, and your current business model doesn’t apply the way you hoped it would. Leading companies in the chemicals industry, for example, traditionally expanded by leveraging the production system they already had in place. This reduced the costs of both product streams. However, this approach led commodity chemicals companies to enter specialty businesses, whose customers demanded custom manufacturing, hands-on service, and rapid-response design that they couldn’t easily deliver. They had crossed a capability boundary, as we call it, in which the old capabilities no longer provided economic or customer acquisition advantages. As a result, over time the industry has specialized, evolving away from multicompetency conglomerates. Some companies returned to commodities while others migrated to a focus on agricultural products or specialty chemicals.
Capability boundaries also often arise when companies seek geographic expansion. For example, consumer product and retail companies moving from Europe or the U.S. to emerging markets such as India must adapt to radically different requirements and build new types of relationships. Retailers may have to modify store formats, assortments, logistics approaches, and brand positioning for local markets — sometimes to the point where their capabilities system may not easily stretch to accommodate distant locations or cultures, and still take advantage of the same value propositions and capabilities systems that make them successful at home.
In general, you should cross capability boundaries consciously and cautiously. The secret to successful near-market expansion is balancing creativity in how you extend your capabilities with a judicious view of when you are overstretching. Companies that use traditional adjacency definitions or ignore capability boundaries can easily find themselves in an adjacency trap. One famous example involved Sears Roebuck’s acquisition of the brokerage house Dean Witter Reynolds in 1981. This proved that customers didn’t necessarily want to “buy their stocks where they buy their socks,” as one critic put it. In some industries, companies are choosing to cross capability boundaries to survive. For example, as shown in Exhibit 1, convergence among the computer, telecommunications, and entertainment industries is forcing companies to expand their business definitions. Each company carves out its own path: Thus, Google and Netflix are moving from their established software businesses to generate digital television content, whereas other companies such as Apple and Microsoft have resisted the temptation to cross that capability boundary.

Disruption vs. Evolution

A casual look at the business media would suggest that disruption is everywhere, but disruption has become one of the most overused words in the business lexicon. Too often, a rapid, innovative evolutionary change in an industry is confused with disruption. Knowing the difference has significant implications for your growth strategy, capabilities system, and business model.
Most industries evolve continuously, through technological change, business model innovation, and improvements in everyday practices. Evolution affects companies and their customers — lowering costs, creating new needs–offer gaps, and enhancing products or customer experiences. Even breakthrough innovations, which deliver a step change in costs and benefits but do not require fundamental changes in capabilities systems, are not necessarily disruptions.
True industry disruptions are rare. They happen when a technological or business model innovation thoroughly changes or obliterates existing business models and their associated capabilities systems. Disruptions create situations in which every company has to reexamine its capability boundaries, or risk losing its livelihood.
In the music business, the introduction of the compact disc in the early 1980s was a breakthrough innovation that led widespread evolutionary changes throughout the industry. But it was not disruption; it did not fundamentally change the prevalent talent development, promotion, and physical distribution–based business model. Most of the companies that were prominent before the compact disc held on to their positions and practices after it was introduced.
The introduction of digital music files in the mid-1990s, on the other hand, was disruptive. (See “The Portable Music Saga”.) It utterly changed business models, capabilities systems, and supplier–buyer relationships throughout the industry. Internet-enabled innovations have driven many similar disruptions, in businesses as varied as book retailing, journalism, and on-demand dispatch and use of taxis and limousines.

The Portable Music Saga

In-market, near-market, and disruptive growth opportunities often happen in the same market over time. One of the most compelling examples is the market for portable recorded music and sound over the past 50 years.
It started in the 1950s at the dawn of rock-and-roll music, when teenagers desperately wanted music that they could take with them to their rooms and to parties. They carted around portable record players and boxes of vinyl 45 or 33 RPM discs. When the cost of the transistor fell in the mid-1950s, Texas Instruments and Sony capitalized on this needs–offer gap by offering radios that could be easily carried and mounted in automobiles. This manufactured product also helped build the market for recorded music, in the form of vinyl record albums that people could play at home.
But recorded music and the convenience of portability did not exist in a single package, and thus a further needs–offer gap existed. In 1979, Sony showed that it had found a cycle of continuous renewal when it filled that gap with the introduction of the Walkman, a compact device for playing cassette tapes through miniaturized headphones. This dramatic new play for headroom led the category for many years. Sony’s capabilities in designing and marketing small radios served it extremely well in the world of small audio, even after compact discs supplanted cassettes.
Sony faltered in the late 1990s, when its capabilities system, based on consumer devices, was upended. The shift to digital music file formats, such as MP3, required capabilities in computers and software. Downloadable music files had a clear advantage over compact discs in convenience, selection, and price. By 2001 there were 50 different portable MP3 players for sale on the U.S. market. None of them, however, quite fit the bill. Device interfaces were kludgy, downloading and managing music files could be haphazard and difficult, and online platforms could be quirky and unreliable. Some were downright sketchy (remember Napster?).
Enter Apple. This was one of the very few companies with capabilities in user-friendly product and interface design, technological integration, stylish fashion-forward marketing, and the coordination of creative media (which, along with Steve Jobs’s personal star power and friendships with musicians, helped it negotiate with record labels in the extremely insular music industry).
Apple was thus well positioned to make a dramatically successful near-market move; the iPod hit the market in 2001, at first for Macintosh users only, and was soon outselling its competitors. The company didn’t stop there: It pursued headroom within that territory, by opening the iTunes online music store, enabling consumers to buy and manage digital music simply and reliably and syncing with Windows-based computers as well as its own.
With these innovations, Apple filled a needs–offer gap that few other companies saw: It provided a reliable, standardized system that made purchasing, keeping, and listening to music relatively easy. By 2008, Apple had claimed nearly 50 percent of the market for music players. Its nearest competitor’s share was in the single digits. Adding video, games, publishing, and lifestyle apps, along with the iPhone, represented a series of natural in-market growth moves. For the next five years, Apple had a virtual lock on its customers; they were unwilling to switch because of the compelling nature of the company’s seamless offering.
Since 2013, however, a new needs–offer gap has been identified: Streaming media is even more convenient and less expensive than downloads. The online radio service Pandora was the first to fill this gap, and others are rushing to compete: Amazon with a near-market move, and Spotify and Netflix as new entrants. Apple pursued an in-market move with its Apple Music service, introduced in 2015. Apple Music builds on the acquisition of Beats, a startup founded by music industry veterans, which improved Apple’s capabilities for curating and enhancing audio and video content. This new needs–offer gap is still only partly understood, and it’s not clear which companies will be favored. But it is likely that the headroom is not yet exhausted and further needs–offer gaps will be discovered in the audio–video market as technology continues to evolve.
The impact of biotechnology on pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals is another good example of the difference between evolutionary and disruptive innovation. Advances in biotech have provided major innovations in pharmaceuticals since the 1980s, enabling life science companies to develop entirely new kinds of genetically engineered drugs for treating diseases such as diabetes and cancer. However valuable these innovations have been, they simply provide another way of introducing molecules into the established regulatory, commercial, selling, support, and reimbursement systems. No major changes in the business models or capabilities systems have been required, at least so far. (Personalized medicines may turn out to be more disruptive.)
In agricultural chemicals, however, biotech has been disruptive. The advent of genetically modified plant cells completely changed the roles that seeds and chemicals played throughout the industry’s value chain. Companies that provided genomics had to extend themselves upstream, downstream, and horizontally. Companies that provided agricultural chemicals had to integrate upstream into seeds, and to combine or partner with downstream companies in the processing and delivery chain. In some cases, agricultural companies had to create new brands at the end-user level to capture the value of their innovations.
Companies can respond to evolution and even step-change innovation by improving, and in some cases by adding to, their capabilities systems. But to respond to a true disruption, companies often need to intentionally cross capability boundaries, adding entirely new capabilities to survive. The Lowe’s hardware chain did this successfully in the 1990s. Traditionally, Lowe’s sold construction materials, mainly to professional homebuilders, through small, full-service outlets. In 1982, Home Depot introduced a disruptive new business model — “big box” stores in a home improvement center format. These outlets were much larger than Lowe’s stores (90,000 square feet versus 15,000) and had much lower operating costs, mainly thanks to labor savings from scale and self-service. Lowe’s struggled to compete for nearly 10 years. Then in 1992, Lowe’s converted its own stores to the new home improvement format and became a strong, successful competitor.
If you respond to disruption by changing your business model and capabilities system, as Lowe’s did, you can’t dabble. You have to commit fully to a new business model, and build the necessary capabilities as soon and as thoroughly as possible.

A Cycle of Continuous Renewal

The goal of a growth strategy is to create continuous renewal so that your top-line revenue increases steadily. As we’ve seen, you need a single viable strategy combining in-market and near-market growth, backed up by the right group of capabilities. In-market growth converts your capabilities into increased wallet share, providing returns that fuel investment. Near-market growth makes the most of the investment by using your capabilities more broadly. Capabilities development makes both kinds of growth more successful. Success in each of these areas reinforces success in the others, and the cycle continues to accelerate as long as you stay in practice.
But where to begin? That depends on where you are right now. The possibilities are best visualized as a matrix, in which the horizontal axis represents the distinctiveness of your capabilities system and its relative fit with the opportunities you have or wish to create, and the vertical axis represents the headroom for growth in your current markets. Most companies fit squarely into one of the four resulting quadrants (see Exhibit 2).
The “poor prospects” lack distinctive capabilities and apparent opportunities, and thus are in a weak position. If you are in this group, your only path to organic growth success — assuming your business survives — is to do foundational work on strategy and execution. Focus on improving your core capabilities systems and value propositions. Only then can you consider either in-market or near-market growth strategies.
If you are in the “capabilities-challenged” group, you have ample headroom for growth, but your capabilities aren’t a good fit for the opportunities. This can happen when a company lets its performance drift, or when its market changes, creating new upsides that require different capabilities. Your growth challenge is adding or enhancing capabilities to capture your available headroom, not chasing unrelated markets.
Other companies are “headroom-challenged.” They are successful in their markets as currently defined, but have little upside: Growth prospects are leveling off. If you are in this group, start looking for previously unnoticed opportunities for in-market growth, and leverage or improve your distinctive capabilities to exploit them. Alternatively, seek near-market opportunities by redefining or reimagining your business. A hardware or software supplier may redefine itself as a solutions provider (many tech companies have done this). A search-engine company can become an information management company, as Google has. A food company can recast itself as a nutrition company (consider Nestlé). Redefining your business puts you in the “capabilities-challenged” group, where new skills will be required, and risk may increase — but so will opportunities. As your capabilities systems improve in response to their deployment in your new near-market expansion, you will move into the “growth leaders” category.
If you are already among the fortunate companies in that quadrant, the key to sustained, profitable growth is a balanced mix of all the levers we have discussed, tailored to your company’s needs and culture. Continue to mine in-market opportunities, to use your insights and talent to capture valid adjacencies, and to reimagine your capabilities as necessary. From time to time, you’ll hit ceilings to your headroom and need to expand into new markets or build new capabilities. You may even face genuine disruption. Then you’ll move around the cycle again — identifying new headroom for growth that represents a good potential fit, developing the distinctive capabilities you need, and returning to your position as a growth leader (see Exhibit 3).
Sustainable growth requires building this type of continuous renewal cycle. Your pace around the cycle may be set by the clock speed of your industry: Technology firms cycle more quickly than chemicals companies. But no matter how fast or slow your industry, your potential for continuous growth depends on how well you can manage these dynamics — how skilled you become at seeing potential for growth, and building capabilities to realize that potential.
Successful companies avoid getting stuck in the “headroom-challenged” category, or drifting into “poor prospects” territory, by continuously renewing their capabilities. You can build or expand some capabilities through organic methods such as innovation and marketing, you can “borrow” other capabilities through alliances with other enterprises, and you can buy still other capabilities through mergers and acquisitions.

What about M&A?

Mergers and acquisitions are so closely associated with expansion that the term inorganic growth is frequently used to refer to such deals. But this terminology can be misleading. Inorganic methods, such as acquisitions, are not actually a form of growth. They are capability acquisition tools. An M&A deal does not automatically expand a company’s customer base or revenue stream beyond what the two merged companies previously had available to them. It may increase potential for growth, but the company still has to put its new capabilities to use to realize that potential.
Thus the most successful acquirers are those that acquire with a capabilities mind-set. They outperform those who are not capabilities-driven by more than 14 percentage points in total shareholder returns. (See “Deals That Win,” by J. Neely, John Jullens, and Joerg Krings.)

Sustainable Growth in Practice

One way to ensure this cycle of continuous renewal is through capabilities chaining: developing new capabilities that complement your existing ones, so that you can use all of this proficiency to enter a new line of business. For example, to expand from the photography industry to healthcare, Fujifilm is using its existing capabilities in material science, engineering, and quality manufacturing. To complement these, it bought two firms involved in regenerative medicine research: Cellular Dynamics International (based in the U.S.) and Japan’s Tissue Engineering Corporation (J-TEC). In March 2015, Fujifilm chairman and CEO Shigetaka Komori told the Japanese newspaperNikkei, “If we combine the three companies’ technologies [those of Fujifilm, J-TEC, and Cellular Dynamics], they can be put to use in a variety of…applications, such as tissue and organ regeneration…. We’re aiming to become the world’s top regenerative medicine company.”
When you create your own prospective capability chain map, draw pragmatic linkages between what you do well now and the opportunities you see ahead. The map shows what capabilities are needed for each new step, and identifies ways to take that step successfully.
The art of growth is balancing and sequencing all the levers we have discussed: in-market leverage, near-market expansion, and capability development; organic tools, alliances, and mergers and acquisitions. Capabilities chaining brings your innovation and inorganic options together into one coherent make-versus-buy framework. As an example, we have mapped the growth of some of General Electric, which has used capabilities chaining in this way since the 1950s (see Exhibit 4). You seek an approach tailored to your company, combining insight and creativity with pragmatism and execution. And whenever you become too settled and secure, you look for new headroom and begin the cycle all over again.
Cintas Corporation, which provides uniforms and specialized services to companies, is an example of a highly successful company that has created this type of continuous growth cycle. Cintas began in the Great Depression as an industrial laundry that reclaimed and cleaned rags for local factories around Cincinnati. The company later began renting towels to customers, replacing them or repairing them as needed. Over time, Cintas created a distinctive set of capabilities and its own business model — “The Cintas Way” — combining excellence in plant operations, a highly refined logistics capability, and service innovation with customer knowledge and sales and service networks. The company has grown steadily through an integrated evolutionary approach. Cintas’s cycle of continuous growth included three major approaches to expansion (see Exhibit 5).

1. In-market leverage. Growth accelerated as the company pursued in-market opportunities, first renting (as well as laundering, repairing, and replacing) uniforms for factory workers, and then additionally offering uniforms for front-office personnel and specialty items such as flame-resistant garments for specific needs. At the same time, Cintas worked with manufacturers to develop new materials that would be resistant to staining, that would stand up to repeated washing and need little ironing, and that would provide protection as well as style.
2. Near-market expansion. Cintas enters new markets and geographies by cautiously testing whether its core business model will prosper before committing to those opportunities. The company has leveraged its capabilities system by adding other clearly linked services, including renting and cleaning floor mats; providing washroom supplies; and managing, cleaning, providing, and servicing first-aid kits and fire extinguishers. The company moved into adjacent businesses by offering services to existing customers such as employee safety training, and by expanding its customer base to include companies in other industries such as hotels and airlines.
3. Capability development. Cintas was also able to realize when it had reached the limits of its capabilities system. After entering and building a successful document storage and imaging business to offer additional services to customers, the company figured out that this new business was driven as much by commodity prices and real estate as by Cintas’s own strengths in logistics, services, and operations. In 2014, Cintas sold this business. Finally, Cintas has used mergers and acquisitions to access and test new capabilities and new services, and expanded by rolling up smaller companies in similar businesses, where the company could further leverage its capabilities.
This cycle of continuous growth has given Cintas strong and consistent financial performance over the decades, and enabled the company to successfully weather the post-2008 downturn. Today, Cintas is one of the largest business services suppliers in North America; it employs 30,000 people, serves more than 900,000 customers, and maintains 430 facilities, including six manufacturing plants and nine distribution centers.
Companies that have struggled to grow consistently tend to think about growth in terms of contradictions: sticking with their current markets versus moving into new ones; leveraging versus enhancing their capabilities; growing their current business versus expanding via M&A; “staying true to themselves” versus leaving their corporate identity behind — but these are all false choices. The art of continuous growth involves reconciling activities that only seem to contradict one another. Combining them will yield a capabilities-driven strategy that will generate continuous growth.