“Research indicates that workers have three prime needs: Interesting work, recognition for doing a good job, and being let in on things that are going on in the company.” Zig Ziglar
Many years ago I read “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” by Thomas Kuhn. The main idea he developed is that once a theory cannot explain the observable reality anymore, a crisis must emerge, a revolution should occur, and a new theory must be formulated and embraced, until the process begins again. The most common Performance Management system, the one based on numerical ratings and a one-time a year appraisal, is in crisis. The existing theory cannot explain anymore the observable reality of a worker’s performance, a crisis is evident, and a performance revolution must happen.
In my opinion, as proven throughout recent history, the existing Performance Management system was intrinsically flawed and doomed to fail, particularly the approach to assess whether individuals and teams are top performers or not.
This is not just my subjective observation; there is research to support this argument. The “2013 Global Performance Management Survey Report” by the consulting firm MERCER found that “51% of respondents said that their [goal] planning process needs work, 42% said the linkage to compensation needs work, and 48% said that the overall approach needs work”.
The most remarkable finding made by MERCER, however, is that only 3% of respondents “reported that their overall management system delivers exceptional value”. It is important to notice that nearly 90% of organizations surveyed have a common Performance Management system: goal setting, mid-year check in and individual-rating-based appraisals. The same report indicated that the most important manager’s skill to drive high performing organizations and overall success is “having candid dialogue” (AKA, constant feedback). The report also indicates that 89% of the organizations have performance ratings, and that 89% link individual ratings to compensation decisions.
Similar to the MERCER report, in a public survey carried out by Deloitte, 58% of executives surveyed “believe that their current performance management approach drives neither employee engagement nor high performance.”
Unfortunately, as it is evidenced, most organizations still consider "the carrot and the stick" approach to be worthwhile as a way to motivate people. These organizations and their management are still injecting life to the dying theory of Performance Management. If only these organizations understood that the way to achieve better results, higher performance and exceptionally value, therefore accomplishing growth and sustainability, is by doing things in a different way. We already tried and, hopefully learned, that the one way not to achieve high performance is by having a ranking-based approach.
“All organizations are perfectly designed to get the results they are now getting. If we want different results, we must change the way we do things.” Tom Northup
As probably most of us know (and have experienced ourselves) individual ratings in a final appraisal are a huge roadblock to unleash the potential of people and keep them motivated. This also goes along with the discussion of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivators.
When I look around, most organizations that I come across with have designed and put in place incentive and reward systems that appeal only to those who are extrinsically motivated. If you get an Excellent, you receive x%, but if you get an “Ok” (of course, they don’t call it that, but “Meet Expectations” or any other fancy name to say that the quality of your work is… “Ok”) you receive a far lower financial incentive.
I believe that the approach of offering purely financial incentives to drive for high performance achieves the opposite effect of what it seeks. It actually encourages and promotes the wrong kind of behaviors. It sort of forces people to do whatever is needed in order to get that Excellent rating, regardless of the real effect that their work has on the collective entity that is the organization. Not surprisingly, we see organizations sinking very fast, but full of shining individual stars. Keep in mind the case of Enron, whereby individual stars dishonestly tried to make their way up the corporate ladder, while at the same time hiding a reality that soon exploded. As William Shakespeare said:
“His promises were, as he then was, mighty; But his performance, as he is now, nothing.”
Now, in addition to having shining stars in the “Excellent” performance realm, a rewards system that is overly focused on extrinsic motivators also misses the big opportunity to tap in the potential of people who are intrinsically motivated, people who need constant feedback and acknowledgement, as well as Support and Challenge from their leaders.
These individuals (particularly Millennials – who will account for 64% of the workforce by the year 2020 according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics) get enough energy and motivation when their leaders meet with them on a regular basis, help them overcome the challenges that might be undermining their true capacity for high performance, acknowledge their accomplishments in real time and back them up, and support/challenge them to achieve even higher goals.
For Millennials (but also very much across generations), as has been indicated in a research by The Conference Board, feedback and flexibility are essential incentives (taking for granted, of course, that they are not exploited by their employers, but have a competitive salary). This system is different than one that constantly praises “good” performers. It is rather a system that rewards high performance, tap into the challenges of low performers, at the time that achieves a highly energized organization and teams. The system, however, requires that leaders have the skills and abilities to have real and thorough conversations with their teams.
“Curious that we spend more time congratulating people who have succeeded than encouraging people who have not.” Neil deGrasse Tyson
I was once delivering a workshop on performance and somebody said “even if I get an ‘Excellent’ rating, the monetary compensation is the equivalent of two cups of a coffee a day. I want much more than that”. What does “much more than that” mean? Deloitte and Accenture are acting as trailblazers in this arena by thinking outside the box and experimenting with another methods to incentivize their workers. I believe feedback and opportunities to unleash talents are the two most important ideas behind the “much more than that”.
Constant positive and developmental feedback (not praise!) is one of the components of a bigger, more effective and purposeful approach than a merely rating-financial-compensation approach. Deloitte and Accenture deemed it necessary not only to give an answer to the Performance Management crisis, but they also take into account an updated generational (mostly because the influx of millennials in their workforce) approach in which unleashing the potential and maximizing the opportunities for learning and development are by far more important than a monetary incentive. I should say that having the equivalent in money to two extra cups a coffee a day, for a year, is definitely not a bad thing. Monetary compensation is, indeed, a critical factor..
Now, would someone go the extra mile because they received a monetary compensation as a product of their rating-based performance? is that compensation directly linked to an emergence of creativity and innovation? The answer to both questions is a definite no. Research shows the effects of diminishing marginal returns of monetary compensation for performance. After some point, it doesn’t make a real difference on your performance (your rating might still be the best, not your actual performance, though) to receive an Excellent rating.
The good news is that, despite the fact that the crisis of Performance Management started a long time ago, the revolution is just beginning, and at a greater scale. Deloitte and Accenture are part of that revolution. Have they come up with the right theory to explain a new reality? Is their newly implemented Performance Management process the best approach? To be honest, I don’t know. We have yet to see.
Nevertheless, the neat thing about Deloitte and Accenture revamping their Performance Management system is that it is bringing to the table an ugly topic. You know, everybody loves to hate performance. And, as it happens very often, people don’t want to talk about what they hate. However, Deloitte and Accenture’s revolutionary approach to Performance is renewing a seemingly dead interest in talking about it, thereby creating a huge amount of dialogue, research, papers and, best of all, organizations questioning their own systems.
In a recent interview with the retiring CEO of Accenture, Pierre Nanterme, in the Washington Post, he said about Performance Management:
“We are not sure that spending all that time on performance management has been yielding a great outcome. And for the millennium generation, it’s not the way they want to be recognized, the way they want to be measured. If you put this new generation in the box of the performance management we’ve used the last 30 years, you lose them. We’re done with the famous annual performance review, where once a year I’m going to share with you what I think about you. That doesn’t make any sense. Performance is an ongoing activity. It’s every day, after any client interaction or business interaction or corporate interaction. It’s much more fluid. People want to know on an ongoing basis, am I doing right? Am I moving in the right direction? Do you think I’m progressing? Nobody’s going to wait for an annual cycle to get that feedback. Now it’s all about instant performance management.”
Even though Mr. Nanterme mentioned Millennials and the risk of losing them with the existing practices in Performance Management, I think organizations are already losing real potential across generations. And I purposefully use the expression “losing potential”. To me, this doesn’t mean that people are necessarily quitting their jobs, more so if they are not too far from retirement, but it means that they might not be using their full capacities to achieve even higher levels of performance, creativity and innovation.
We should be the protagonists of this revolution in the making. In that sense, for all our organizations, talking about the way we measure performance should be of paramount importance. From there, I think that the next steps in the conversation must be how to incentivize the constant formal and informal conversations between leaders and people (showcasing the benefits and results for the organization, the leaders and the people); provide collective incentives to team performance; create mechanisms in which individuals can also provide bottom-up feedback to their bosses and even appeal to the self-interests and ego of the leaders: show them the results that such a culture can have for them. In the words of Laszlo Bock in his book “The Work Rules”:
“Performance improved only when companies implemented programs to empower employees (for example, by taking decision-making authority away from managers and giving it to individuals or teams), provided learning opportunities that were outside what people needed to do their jobs, increased their reliance on teamwork (by giving teams more autonomy and allowing them to self-organize), or a combination of these.”
I keep in perspective that changes might happen bottom-up, top-down, or simply altogether. It only takes courage and leadership from the organization as an entity. Stephen Covey said “management is efficiency in climbing the ladder of success; leadership determines whether the ladder is leaning against the right wall.” I know we need to measure performance, but, do we have the ladder on the right wall?
The ugly topic of performance is on the table and we have a big responsibility to shake up our beliefs in older and dying merit-pay systems and open the door to more energizing and refreshing approaches, be it the Deloitte/Accenture approach, or the new approaches not yet created.
When a top team fails to function, it can paralyze a whole company. Here’s what CEOs need to watch out for.
byMichiel Kruyt, Judy Malan, and Rachel Tuffield
Few teams function as well as they could. But the stakes get higher with senior-executive teams: dysfunctional ones can slow down, derail, or even paralyze a whole company. In our work with top teams at more than 100 leading multinational companies,1 including surveys with 600 senior executives at 30 of them, we’ve identified three crucial priorities for constructing and managing effective top teams. Getting these priorities right can help drive better business outcomes in areas ranging from customer satisfaction to worker productivity and many more as well.
1. Get the right people on the team . . . and the wrong ones off
Determining the membership of a top team is the CEO’s responsibility—and frequently the most powerful lever to shape a team’s performance. Many CEOs regret not employing this lever early enough or thoroughly enough. Still others neglect it entirely, assuming instead that factors such as titles, pay grades, or an executive’s position on the org chart are enough to warrant default membership. Little surprise, then, that more than one-third of the executives we surveyed said their top teams did not have the right people and capabilities.
The key to getting a top team’s composition right is deciding what contributions the team as a whole, and its members as individuals, must make to achieve an organization’s performance aspirations and then making the necessary changes in the team. This sounds straight-forward, but it typically requires conscious attention and courage from the CEO; otherwise, the top team can underdeliver for an extended period of time.
That was certainly the case at a technology services company that had a struggling top team: fewer than one in five of its members thought it was highly respected or shared a common vision for the future, and only one in three thought it made a valuable contribution to corporate performance. The company’s customers were very dissatisfied—they rated its cost, quality, and service delivery at only 2.3 on a 7-point scale—and the team couldn’t even agree on the root causes.
A new CEO reorganized the company, creating a new strategy group and moving from a geography-based structure to one based on two customer-focused business units—for wholesale and for retail. He adapted the composition of his top team, making the difficult decision to remove two influential regional executives who had strongly resisted cross-organizational collaboration and adding the executive leading the strategy group and the two executives leading the retail and the wholesale businesses, respectively. The CEO then used a series of workshops to build trust and a spirit of collaboration among the members of his new team and to eliminate the old regional silo mentality. The team also changed its own performance metrics, adding customer service and satisfaction performance indicators to the traditional short-term sales ones.
Customers rated the company’s service at 4.3 a year later and at 5.4 two years later. Meanwhile, the top team, buoyed by these results, was now confident that it was better prepared to improve the company’s performance. In the words of one team member, “I wouldn’t have believed we could have come this far in just one year.”
2. Make sure the top team does just the work only it can do
Many top teams struggle to find purpose and focus. Only 38 percent of the executives we surveyed said their teams focused on work that truly benefited from a top-team perspective. Only 35 percent said their top teams allocated the right amounts of time among the various topics they considered important, such as strategy and people.
What are they doing instead? Everything else. Too often, top teams fail to set or enforce priorities and instead try to cover the waterfront. In other cases, they fail to distinguish between topics they must act on collectively and those they should merely monitor. These shortcomings create jam-packed agendas that no top team can manage properly. Often, the result is energy-sapping meetings that drag on far too long and don’t engage the team, leaving members wondering when they can get back to “real work.” CEOs typically need to respond when such dysfunctions arise; it’s unlikely that the senior team’s members—who have their own business unit goals and personal career incentives—will be able to sort out a coherent set of collective top-team priorities without a concerted effort.
The CEO and the top team at a European consumer goods company rationalized their priorities by creating a long list of potential topics they could address. Then they asked which of these had a high value to the business, given where they wanted to take it, and would allow them, as a group, to add extraordinary value. While narrowing the list down to ten items, team members spent considerable time challenging each other about which topics individual team members could handle or delegate. They concluded, for example, that projects requiring no cross-functional or cross-regional work, such as addressing lagging performance in a single region, did not require the top team’s collective attention even when these projects were the responsibility of an individual team member. For delegated responsibilities, they created a transparent and consistent set of performance indicators to help them monitor progress.
This change gave the top team breathing room to do more valuable work. For the first time, it could focus enough effort on setting and dynamically adapting cross-category and cross-geography priorities and resource allocations and on deploying the top 50 leaders across regional and functional boundaries, thus building a more effective extended leadership group for the company. This, in turn, proved crucial as the team led a turnaround that took the company from a declining to a growing market share. The team’s tighter focus also helped boost morale and performance at the company’s lower levels, where employees now had more delegated responsibility. Employee satisfaction scores improved to 79 percent, from 54 percent, in just one year.
3. Address team dynamics and processes
A final area demanding unrelenting attention from CEOs is effective team dynamics, whose absence is a frequent problem: among the top teams we studied, members reported that only about 30 percent of their time was spent in “productive collaboration”—a figure that dropped even more when teams dealt with high-stakes topics where members had differing, entrenched interests. Here are three examples of how poor dynamics depress performance:
The top team at a large mining company formed two camps with opposing views on how to address an important strategic challenge. The discussions on this topic hijacked the team’s agenda for an extended period, yet no decisions were made.
The top team at a Latin American insurance company was completely demoralized when it began losing money after government reforms opened up the country to new competition. The team wandered, with little sense of direction or accountability, and blamed its situation on the government’s actions. As unproductive discussions prevented the top team from taking meaningful action, other employees became dissatisfied and costs got out of control.
The top team at a North American financial-services firm was not aligned effectively for a critical company-wide operational-improvement effort. As a result, different departments were taking counterproductive and sometimes contradictory actions. One group, for example, tried to increase cross-selling, while another refused to share relevant information about customers because it wanted to “own” relationships with them.
CEOs can take several steps to remedy problems with team dynamics. The first is to work with the team to develop a common, objective understanding of why its members aren’t collaborating effectively. There are several tools available for the purpose, including top-team surveys, interviews with team members, and 360-degree evaluations of individual leaders. The CEO of the Latin American insurance company used these methods to discover that the members of his top team needed to address building relationships and trust with one another and with the organization even before they agreed on a new corporate strategy and on the cultural changes necessary to meet its goals (for more on building trust, see “Dispatches from the front lines of management innovation”). One of the important cultural changes for this top team was that its members needed to take ownership of the changes in the company’s performance and culture and to hold one another accountable for living up to this commitment.
Correcting dysfunctional dynamics requires focused attention and interventions, preferably as soon as an ineffective pattern shows up. At the mining company, the CEO learned, during a board meeting focused on the team’s dynamics, that his approach—letting the unresolved discussion go on in hopes of gaining consensus and commitment from the team—wasn’t working and that his team expected him to step in. Once this became clear, the CEO brokered a decision and had the team jump-start its implementation.
Often more than a single intervention is needed. Once the CEO at the financial-services firm understood how poorly his team was aligned, for example, he held a series of top-team off-site meetings aimed specifically at generating greater agreement on strategy. One result: the team made aligning the organization part of its collective agenda, and its members committed themselves to communicating and checking in regularly with leaders at lower levels of the organization to ensure that they too were working consistently and collaboratively on the new strategy. One year later, the top team was much more unified around the aims of the operational-improvement initiative—the proportion of executives who said the team had clarity of direction doubled, to 70 percent, and the team was no longer working at cross-purposes. Meanwhile, operational improvements were gaining steam: costs came down by 20 percent over the same period, and the proportion of work completed on time rose by 8 percent, to 96.3 percent.
Finally, most teams need to change their support systems or processes to catalyze and embed change. At the insurer, for example, the CEO saw to it that each top-team member’s performance indicators in areas such as cost containment and employee satisfaction were aligned and pushed the team’s members to share their divisional performance data. The new approach allowed these executives to hold each other accountable for performance and made it impossible to continue avoiding tough conversations about lagging performance and cross-organizational issues. Within two years, the team’s dynamics had improved, along with the company’s financials—to a return on invested capital (ROIC) of 16.6 percent, from –8.8 percent, largely because the team collectively executed its roles more effectively and ensured that the company met its cost control and growth goals.
Each top team is unique, and every CEO will need to address a unique combination of challenges. As the earlier examples show, developing a highly effective top team typically requires good diagnostics, followed by a series of workshops and field work to address the dynamics of the team while it attends to hard business issues. When a CEO gets serious about making sure that her top team’s members are willing and able to help meet the company’s strategic goals, about ensuring that the team always focuses on the right topics, and about managing dynamics, she’s likely to get results. The best top teams will begin to take collective responsibility and to develop the ability to maintain and improve their own effectiveness, creating a lasting performance edge.
About the authors
Michiel Kruyt is an associate principal in McKinsey’s Amsterdam office, Judy Malan is a principal in the Johannesburg office, and Rachel Tuffield is an alumnus of the Sydney office.
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Carolyn Aiken, a principal in McKinsey’s Toronto office, and Scott Keller, a director in the Chicago office.
There is a significant disparity between what managers say entry level employees need to succeed, and how man new hires actually have those skills in the managers’ opinions.
When it comes to hiring entry level employees, managers place a premium on attributes over skills, with a higher emphasis on finding and hiring individuals with skills that are difficult or impossible to be taught. When hiring:
85% reported work ethic was the most important attribute for employee success.
79% reported a candidate’s prestigious schooling was the least important consideration to make.
Only 4% of managers said how well a candidate performed during interview was the most important consideration to make when hiring.
The idea of wave personality is a substantial expansion of the Wave Principle. It has the advantages of bringing human behavior more personally into the equation and even more important, of enhancing the utility of standard technical analysis.
The personality of each wave in the Elliott sequence is an integral part of the reflection of the mass psychology it embodies. The progression of mass emotions from pessimism to optimism and back again tends to follow a similar path each time around, producing similar circumstances at corresponding points in the wave structure. The personality of each wave type is usually manifest whether the wave is of Grand Supercycle degree or Subminuette. These properties not only forewarn the analyst about what to expect in the next sequence but at times can help determine one's present location in the progression of waves, when for other reasons the count is unclear or open to differing interpretations. As waves are in the process of unfolding, there are times when several different wave counts are perfectly admissible under all known Elliott rules. It is at these junctures that a knowledge of wave personality can be invaluable. If the analyst recognizes the character of a single wave, he can often correctly interpret the complexities of the larger pattern. The following discussions relate to an underlying bull market picture, as illustrated in Figures 2-14 and 2-15. These observations apply in reverse when the actionary waves are downward and the reactionary waves are upward.
Figure 2-14
Wave Personality
1) First waves — As a rough estimate, about half of first waves are part of the "basing" process and thus tend to be heavily corrected by wave two. In contrast to the bear market rallies within the previous decline, however, this first wave rise is technically more constructive, often displaying a subtle increase in volume and breadth. Plenty of short selling is in evidence as the majority has finally become convinced that the overall trend is down. Investors have finally gotten "one more rally to sell on," and they take advantage of it. The other fifty percent of first waves rise from either large bases formed by the previous correction, as in 1949, from downside failures, as in 1962, or from extreme compression, as in both 1962 and 1974. From such beginnings, first waves are dynamic and only moderately retraced.
2) Second waves — Second waves often retrace so much of wave one that most of the advancement up to that time is eroded away by the time it ends. This is especially true of call option purchases, as premiums sink drastically in the environment of fear during second waves. At this point, investors are thoroughly convinced that the bear market is back to stay. Second waves often produce downside non-confirmations and Dow Theory "buy spots," when low volume and volatility indicate a drying up of selling pressure.
3) Third waves — Third waves are wonders to behold. They are strong and broad, and the trend at this point is unmistakable. Increasingly favorable fundamentals enter the picture as confidence returns. Third waves usually generate the greatest volume and price movement and are most often the extended wave in a series. It follows, of course, that the third wave of a third wave, and so on, will be the most volatile point of strength in any wave sequence. Such points invariably produce breakouts, "continuation" gaps, volume expansions, exceptional breadth, major Dow Theory trend confirmations and runaway price movement, creating large hourly, daily, weekly, monthly or yearly gains in the market, depending on the degree of the wave. Virtually all stocks participate in third waves. Besides the personality of "B" waves, that of third waves produces the most valuable clues to the wave count as it unfolds.
4) Fourth waves — Fourth waves are predictable in both depth (see Lesson 11) and form, because by alternation they should differ from the previous second wave of the same degree. More often than not they trend sideways, building the base for the final fifth wave move. Lagging stocks build their tops and begin declining during this wave, since only the strength of a third wave was able to generate any motion in them in the first place. This initial deterioration in the market sets the stage for non-confirmations and subtle signs of weakness during the fifth wave.
5) Fifth waves — Fifth waves in stocks are always less dynamic than third waves in terms of breadth. They usually display a slower maximum speed of price change as well, although if a fifth wave is an extension, speed of price change in the third of the fifth can exceed that of the third wave. Similarly, while it is common for volume to increase through successive impulse waves at Cycle degree or larger, it usually happens below Primary degree only if the fifth wave extends. Otherwise, look for lesser volume as a rule in a fifth wave as opposed to the third. Market dabblers sometimes call for "blowoffs" at the end of long trends, but the stock market has no history of reaching maximum acceleration at a peak. Even if a fifth wave extends, the fifth of the fifth will lack the dynamism of what preceded it. During fifth advancing waves, optimism runs extremely high, despite a narrowing of breadth. Nevertheless, market action does improve relative to prior corrective wave rallies. For example, the year-end rally in 1976 was unexciting in the Dow, but it was nevertheless a motive wave as opposed to the preceding corrective wave advances in April, July and September, which, by contrast, had even less influence on the secondary indexes and the cumulative advance-decline line. As a monument to the optimism that fifth waves can produce, the market forecasting services polled two weeks after the conclusion of that rally turned in the lowest percentage of "bears," 4.5%, in the history of the recorded figures despite that fifth wave's failure to make a new high!
Figure 2-15
6) "A" waves — During "A" waves of bear markets, the investment world is generally convinced that this reaction is just a pullback pursuant to the next leg of advance. The public surges to the buy side despite the first really technically damaging cracks in individual stock patterns. The "A" wave sets the tone for the "B" wave to follow. A five-wave A indicates a zigzag for wave B, while a three-wave A indicates a flat or triangle.
7) "B" waves — "B" waves are phonies. They are sucker plays, bull traps, speculators' paradise, orgies of odd-lotter mentality or expressions of dumb institutional complacency (or both). They often involve a focus on a narrow list of stocks, are often "unconfirmed" (Dow Theory is covered in Lesson 28) by other averages, are rarely technically strong, and are virtually always doomed to complete retracement by wave C. If the analyst can easily say to himself, "There is something wrong with this market," chances are it's a "B" wave. "X" waves and "D" waves in expanding triangles, both of which are corrective wave advances, have the same characteristics. Several examples will suffice to illustrate the point.
— The upward correction of 1930 was wave B within the 1929-1932 A-B-C zigzag decline. Robert Rhea describes the emotional climate well in his opus, The Story of the Averages (1934):
...many observers took it to be a bull market signal. I can remember having shorted stocks early in December, 1929, after having completed a satisfactory short position in October. When the slow but steady advance of January and February carried above [the previous high], I became panicky and covered at considerable loss. ...I forgot that the rally might normally be expected to retrace possibly 66 percent or more of the 1929 downswing. Nearly everyone was proclaiming a new bull market. Services were extremely bullish, and the upside volume was running higher than at the peak in 1929.
— The 1961-1962 rise was wave (b) in an (a)-(b)-(c) expanded flat correction. At the top in early 1962, stocks were selling at unheard of price/earnings multiples that had not been seen up to that time and have not been seen since. Cumulative breadth had already peaked along with the top of the third wave in 1959.
— The rise from 1966 to 1968 was wave [B]* in a corrective pattern of Cycle degree. Emotionalism had gripped the public and "cheapies" were skyrocketing in the speculative fever, unlike the orderly and usually fundamentally justifiable participation of the secondaries within first and third waves. The Dow Industrials struggled unconvincingly higher throughout the advance and finally refused to confirm the phenomenal new highs in the secondary indexes.
— In 1977, the Dow Jones Transportation Average climbed to new highs in a "B" wave, miserably unconfirmed by the Industrials. Airlines and truckers were sluggish. Only the coal-carrying rails were participating as part of the energy play. Thus, breadth within the index was conspicuously lacking, confirming again that good breadth is generally a property of impulse waves, not corrections.
As a general observation, "B" waves of Intermediate degree and lower usually show a diminution of volume, while "B" waves of Primary degree and greater can display volume heavier than that which accompanied the preceding bull market, usually indicating wide public participation.
8) "C" waves — Declining "C" waves are usually devastating in their destruction. They are third waves and have most of the properties of third waves. It is during this decline that there is virtually no place to hide except cash. The illusions held throughout waves A and B tend to evaporate and fear takes over. "C" waves are persistent and broad. 1930-1932 was a "C" wave. 1962 was a "C" wave. 1969-1970 and 1973-1974 can be classified as "C" waves. Advancing "C" waves within upward corrections in larger bear markets are just as dynamic and can be mistaken for the start of a new upswing, especially since they unfold in five waves. The October 1973 rally (see Figure 1-37), for instance, was a "C" wave in an inverted expanded flat correction.
9) "D" waves — "D" waves in all but expanding triangles are often accompanied by increased volume. This is true probably because "D" waves in non-expanding triangles are hybrids, part corrective, yet having some characteristics of first waves since they follow "C" waves and are not fully retraced. "D" waves, being advances within corrective waves, are as phony as "B" waves. The rise from 1970 to 1973 was wave [D] within the large wave IV of Cycle degree. The "one-decision" complacency that characterized the attitude of the average institutional fund manager at the time is well documented. The area of participation again was narrow, this time the "nifty fifty" growth and glamour issues. Breadth, as well as the Transportation Average, topped early, in 1972, and refused to confirm the extremely high multiples bestowed upon the favorite fifty. Washington was inflating at full steam to sustain the illusory prosperity during the entire advance in preparation for the election. As with the preceding wave [B], "phony" was an apt description.
10) "E" waves — "E" waves in triangles appear to most market observers to be the dramatic kickoff of a new downtrend after a top has been built. They almost always are accompanied by strongly supportive news. That, in conjunction with the tendency of "E" waves to stage a false breakdown through the triangle boundary line, intensifies the bearish conviction of market participants at precisely the time that they should be preparing for a substantial move in the opposite direction. Thus, "E" waves, being ending waves, are attended by a psychology as emotional as that of fifth waves.
Wave Tendencies
Because the tendencies discussed here are not inevitable, they are stated not as rules, but as guidelines. Their lack of inevitability nevertheless detracts little from their utility. For example, take a look at Figure 2-16, an hourly chart showing the first four Minor waves in the DJIA rally off the March 1, 1978 low. The waves are textbook Elliott from beginning to end, from the length of waves to the volume pattern (not shown) to the trend channels to the guideline of equality to the retracement by the "a" wave following the extension to the expected low for the fourth wave to the perfect internal counts to alternation to the Fibonacci time sequences to the Fibonacci ratio relationships embodied within. It might be worth noting that 914 would be a reasonable target in that it would mark a .618 retracement of the 1976-1978 decline.
Figure 2-16
There are exceptions to guidelines, but without those, market analysis would be a science of exactitude, not one of probability. Nevertheless, with a thorough knowledge of the guide lines of wave structure, you can be quite confident of your wave count. In effect, you can use the market action to confirm the wave count as well as use the wave count to predict market action.
Notice also that Elliott Wave guidelines cover most aspects of traditional technical analysis, such as market momentum and investor sentiment. The result is that traditional technical analysis now has a greatly increased value in that it serves to aid the identification of the market's exact position in the Elliott Wave structure. To that end, using such tools is by all means encouraged.
Learning the Basics
With a knowledge of the tools in Lessons 1 through 15, any dedicated student can perform expert Elliott Wave analysis. People who neglect to study the subject thoroughly or to apply the tools rigorously have given up before really trying. The best learning procedure is to keep an hourly chart and try to fit all the wiggles into Elliott Wave patterns, while keeping an open mind for all the possibilities. Slowly the scales should drop from your eyes, and you will continually be amazed at what you see.
It is important to remember that while investment tactics always must go with the most valid wave count, knowledge of alternative possibilities can be extremely helpful in adjusting to unexpected events, putting them immediately into perspective, and adapting to the changing market framework. While the rigidities of the rules of wave formation are of great value in choosing entry and exit points, the flexibilities in the admissible patterns eliminate cries that whatever the market is doing now is "impossible."
"When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth." Thus eloquently spoke Sherlock Holmes to his constant companion, Dr. Watson, in Arthur Conan Doyle's The Sign of Four. This one sentence is a capsule summary of what one needs to know to be successful with Elliott. The best approach is deductive reasoning. By knowing what Elliott rules will not allow, one can deduce that whatever remains must be the most likely course for the market. Applying all the rules of extensions, alternation, overlapping, channeling, volume and the rest, the analyst has a much more formidable arsenal than one might imagine at first glance. Unfortunately for many, the approach requires thought and work and rarely provides a mechanical signal. However, this kind of thinking, basically an elimination process, squeezes the best out of what Elliott has to offer and besides, it's fun!
As an example of such deductive reasoning, take another look at Figure 1-14, reproduced below:
Figure 1-14
Cover up the price action from November 17, 1976 forward. Without the wave labels and boundary lines, the market would appear as formless. But with the Wave Principle as a guide, the meaning of the structures becomes clear. Now ask yourself, how would you go about predicting the next movement? Here is Robert Prechter's analysis from that date, from a personal letter to A.J. Frost, summarizing a report he issued for Merrill Lynch the previous day:
Enclosed you will find my current opinion outlined on a recent Trendline chart, although I use only hourly point charts to arrive at these conclusions. My argument is that the third Primary wave, begun in October of 1975, has not completed its course as yet, and that the fifth Intermediate wave of that Primary is now underway. First and most important, I am convinced that October 1975 to March 1976 was so far a three-wave affair, not a five, and that only the possibility of a failure on May 11th could complete that wave as a five. However, the construction following that possible "failure" does not satisfy me as correct, since the first downleg to 956.45 would be of five waves and the entire ensuing construction is obviously a flat. Therefore, I think that we have been in a fourth corrective wave since March 24th. This corrective wave satisfies completely the requirements for an expanding triangle formation, which of course can only be a fourth wave. The trendlines concerned are uncannily accurate, as is the downside objective, obtained by multiplying the first important length of decline (March 24th to June 7th, 55.51 points) by 1.618 to obtain 89.82 points. 89.82 points from the orthodox high of the third Intermediate wave at 1011.96 gives a downside target of 922, which was hit last week (actual hourly low 920.62) on November 11th. This would suggest now a fifth Intermediate back to new highs, completing the third Primary wave. The only problem I can see with this interpretation is that Elliott suggests that fourth wave declines usually hold above the previous fourth wave decline of lesser degree, in this case 950.57 on February 17th, which of course has been broken on the downside. I have found, however, that this rule is not steadfast. The reverse symmetrical triangle formation should be followed by a rally only approximating the width of the widest part of the triangle. Such a rally would suggest 1020-1030 and fall far short of the trendline target of 1090-1100. Also, within third waves, the first and fifth subwaves tend toward equality in time and magnitude. Since the first wave (Oct. 75-Dec.75) was a 10% move in two months, this fifth should cover about 100 points (1020-1030) and peak in January 1977, again short of the trendline mark.
Now uncover the rest of the chart to see how all these guidelines helped in assessing the market's likely path.
Christopher Morley once said, "Dancing is a wonderful training for girls. It is the first way they learn to guess what a man is going to do before he does it." In the same way, the Wave Principle trains the analyst to discern what the market is likely to do before it does it.
After you have acquired an Elliott "touch," it will be forever with you, just as a child who learns to ride a bicycle never forgets. At that point, catching a turn becomes a fairly common experience and not really too difficult. Most important, in giving you a feeling of confidence as to where you are in the progress of the market, a knowledge of Elliott can prepare you psychologically for the inevitable fluctuating nature of price movement and free you from sharing the widely practiced analytical error of forever projecting today's trends linearly into the future.
Practical Application
The Wave Principle is unparalleled in providing an overall perspective on the position of the market most of the time. Most important to individuals, portfolio managers and investment corporations is that the Wave Principle often indicates in advance the relative magnitude of the next period of market progress or regress. Living in harmony with those trends can make the difference between success and failure in financial affairs. Despite the fact that many analysts do not treat it as such, the Wave Principle is by all means an objective study, or as Collins put it, "a disciplined form of technical analysis." Bolton used to say that one of the hardest things he had to learn was to believe what he saw. If the analyst does not believe what he sees, he is likely to read into his analysis what he thinks should be there for some other reason. At this point, his count becomes subjective. Subjective analysis is dangerous and destroys the value of any market approach.
What the Wave Principle provides is an objective means of assessing the relative probabilities of possible future paths for the market. At any time, two or more valid wave interpretations are usually acceptable by the rules of the Wave Principle. The rules are highly specific and keep the number of valid alternatives to a minimum. Among the valid alternatives, the analyst will generally regard as preferred the interpretation that satisfies the largest number of guidelines, and so on. As a result, competent analysts applying the rules and guidelines of the Wave Principle objectively should usually agree on the order of probabilities for various possible outcomes at any particular time. That order can usually be stated with certainty. Let no one assume, however, that certainty about the order of probabilities is the same as certainty about one specific outcome. Under only the rarest of circumstances does the analyst ever know exactly what the market is going to do. One must understand and accept that even an approach that can identify high odds for a fairly specific outcome will be wrong some of the time. Of course, such a result is a far better performance than any other approach to market forecasting provides.
Using Elliott, it is often possible to make money even when you are in error. For instance, after a minor low that you erroneously consider of major importance, you may recognize at a higher level that the market is vulnerable again to new lows. A clear-cut three-wave rally following the minor low rather than the necessary five gives the signal, since a three-wave rally is the sign of an upward correction. Thus, what happens after the turning point often helps confirm or refute the assumed status of the low or high, well in advance of danger.
Even if the market allows no such graceful exit, the Wave Principle still offers exceptional value. Most other approaches to market analysis, whether fundamental, technical or cyclical, have no good way of forcing a change of opinion if you are wrong. The Wave Principle, in contrast, provides a built-in objective method for changing your mind. Since Elliott Wave analysis is based upon price patterns, a pattern identified as having been completed is either over or it isn't. If the market changes direction, the analyst has caught the turn. If the market moves beyond what the apparently completed pattern allows, the conclusion is wrong, and any funds at risk can be reclaimed immediately. Investors using the Wave Principle can prepare themselves psychologically for such outcomes through the continual updating of the second best interpretation, sometimes called the "alternate count." Because applying the Wave Principle is an exercise in probability, the ongoing maintenance of alternative wave counts is an essential part of investing with it. In the event that the market violates the expected scenario, the alternate count immediately becomes the investor's new preferred count. If you're thrown by your horse, it's useful to land right atop another.
Of course, there are often times when, despite a rigorous analysis, the question may arise as to how a developing move is to be counted, or perhaps classified as to degree. When there is no clearly preferred interpretation, the analyst must wait until the count resolves itself, in other words, to "sweep it under the rug until the air clears," as Bolton suggested. Almost always, subsequent moves will clarify the status of previous waves by revealing their position in the pattern of the next higher degree. When subsequent waves clarify the picture, the probability that a turning point is at hand can suddenly and excitingly rise to nearly 100%.
Practical Application
The ability to identify junctures is remarkable enough, but the Wave Principle is the only method of analysis which also provides guidelines for forecasting, as outlined in Lessons 10 through 15 and 20 through 25 of this course. Many of these guidelines are specific and can occasionally yield results of stunning precision. If indeed markets are patterned, and if those patterns have a recognizable geometry, then regardless of the variations allowed, certain price and time relationships are likely to recur. In fact, real world experience shows that they do.
It is our practice to try to determine in advance where the next move will likely take the market. One advantage of setting a target is that it gives a sort of backdrop against which to monitor the market's actual path. This way, you are alerted quickly when something is wrong and can shift your interpretation to a more appropriate one if the market does not do what is expected. If you then learn the reasons for your mistakes, the market will be less likely to mislead you in the future.
Still, no matter what your convictions, it pays never to take your eye off what is happening in the wave structure in real time. Although prediction of target levels well in advance can be done surprisingly often, such predictions are not required in order to make money in the stock market. Ultimately, the market is the message, and a change in behavior can dictate a change in outlook. All one really needs to know at the time is whether to be bullish, bearish or neutral, a decision that can sometimes be made with a swift glance at a chart.
Of the many approaches to stock market analysis, the Elliott Wave Principle, in our view, offers the best tool for identifying market turns as they are approached. If you keep an hourly chart, the fifth of the fifth of the fifth in a primary trend alerts you within hours of a major change in direction by the market. It is a thrilling experience to pinpoint a turn, and the Wave Principle is the only approach that can occasionally provide the opportunity to do so. Elliott may not be the perfect formulation since the stock market is part of life and no formula can enclose it or express it completely. However, the Wave Principle is without a doubt the single most comprehensive approach to market analysis and, viewed in its proper light, delivers everything it promises. http://www.traderslaboratory.com
Experimentation, iteration and improvisational change are all the rage in today’s dynamic business environments. But when evaluating new business opportunities, there’s a paradoxical tension between strategic focus and flexibility that can define or break your business.
Capturing new growth opportunities is fundamental to strategy, innovation and entrepreneurship. But how can managers best meet this challenge? With flexibility or focus? The answer, as it turns out, can be more complex and more crucial to a company’s success than previously thought. Our research on mature corporations, growing businesses and new ventures suggests a paradoxical tension between focus and flexibility that can define or break your business. In this article, we explore when and where to be focused and disciplined versus when to be flexible and opportunistic.
Experimentation is a familiar innovation tool, but some industry pundits suggest that planning rarely succeeds in dynamic environments; instead, they argue for a rapid cycle of experimentation and pivoting.1 Such an approach holds both intuitive and rational appeal in a world characterized by uncertainty, where the flow of opportunities is swift yet unpredictable, where market boundaries are shifting and where competitors are constantly changing. Given the new competitive environment that promotes change and flexibility, is the old strategic emphasis on focus less relevant? We argue it is not. In fact, we discovered in our interviews with a wide variety of managers that focus may be just as important as flexibility, and, counterintuitively, a company’s focus may even influence its flexibility and vice versa. (See “About the Research.”)
Opportunities Are Complex
Opportunities are more complex than people recognize. Few managers recognize that there are two components to capturing a new business opportunity: opportunity selection and opportunity execution. Opportunity selection involves determining which customer problem to solve, whereas opportunity execution deals with solving the particular problem chosen.2 Most books, articles and thought leaders studying opportunities focus heavily on opportunity execution — how to create value by developing a solution for customers. But research suggests that most innovation efforts move so quickly to identify a solution that they have to cycle back to figure out what problem they are actually solving.3
We found that opportunity selection appears to matter as much as opportunity execution, the place where most companies spend their time. More importantly, how you approach opportunity selection (whether with flexibility or with focus) has a critical impact on how successful you are at opportunity execution.
Opportunists vs. Strategists
We observed that managers and entrepreneurs tend to fall into two groups that we label opportunistsand strategists. The opportunists relied on a less scripted and more flexible approach to opportunity selection. Instead of mapping out ahead of time which opportunities they would pursue and then letting the map be their guide for subsequent action, opportunists let emergent customer inquiries shape opportunity selection. For example, one U.S.-based security software company made the choice to enter the German market because a German customer was interested in its security-monitoring services. Likewise, the software company’s decision to go to Switzerland was based on unforeseen customer demand in the country, not a deliberate plan to enter Switzerland. As one company executive stated about that decision, “It was more like we were drawn in rather than a conscious decision.”
On the surface, these managers and entrepreneurs felt they were cherry-picking low-hanging fruit and taking advantage of narrow windows of opportunity before those windows closed or before competitors captured the opportunity. Rather than wasting time developing and then executing detailed plans that might be flawed or outdated or both, they took advantage of what emerged. Overall, this flexible approach to opportunity selection is consistent with the broader strategy and entrepreneurship literature, which argues that the dynamic nature of the markets in which many companies operate lowers the benefit of pre-action deliberation, and that ambiguity is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, many business leaders make better decisions as they go along, rather than beforehand through focused planning.4
Strategists followed a different pattern. Since a central threat facing companies that capture emergent opportunities is the lack of focus associated with trying to address the needs of multiple markets, strategists constrained the selection of opportunities to particular markets in order to help their companies channel efforts toward opportunities that were more likely to result in success. As a result, rather than taking advantage of unforeseen emergent opportunities, strategists were more disciplined. They began by studying the nature of opportunity capture in their market. Once they had done this, they created a focused plan that riveted attention on what they believed was the best opportunity (not just the easiest) and that would allow them to capture several opportunities in a row versus one in isolation. For example, at a Finland-based company that helps organizations manage inventory through point-of-sale software solutions, leaders selected their first international market, Sweden, based on what they could learn — not just on their ability to get a sale. Although not a large market, Sweden was both culturally similar and geographically close. This reduced the risk that the company’s Finnish leaders would be overwhelmed with regional differences and increased the likelihood that they would be able to learn how to do business abroad. As the CEO explained, “We were quite conservative in this process because we didn’t know much about international business. So we started with Sweden.” After Sweden, the company chose Norway, then France, Germany, the United Kingdom and then the United States. It was able to gain experience in progressively bigger markets and exploit its growing knowledge. Overall, by being more focused in opportunity selection, companies can start with easier opportunities or opportunities that are advantageous to pursue earlier; those initial opportunities then provide the foundation for subsequent opportunities. Thus, just as the order of assembly is key when building a bridge or assembling a computer, the order of experience appears critical for effective opportunity capture.
Flexible Selection and Inflexible Execution
So how do these different patterns for opportunity selection unfold? Although flexibility can be extremely useful, we found that the opportunists who had been the most flexible in the opportunity selection phase tended to be the least flexible in the execution phase. In other words, although these managers were adept at flexibly responding to emergent opportunities, once they started to execute the opportunities, many became surprisingly inflexible. For example, at a U.S.-based medical imaging software company, leaders were very flexible about the selection of opportunities. One cofounder noted, “We were trying to get something going in Europe, so we looked for opportunities and we cherry-picked.” The company decided to enter Sweden based on some interest from local doctors there. Yet, after the company entered Sweden, the doctors appeared reluctant to use what they viewed as a new technology for an established method of mammography. Importantly, instead of flexibly executing the opportunity and changing their solutions to meet local market needs, the software company attempted to sell Americanized products everywhere. Executives selected their second country, Norway, in the same flexible fashion. When sales there didn’t materialize, executives believed the targeted customers didn’t understand the product. Rather than adjusting their approach, they pushed existing solutions. The pattern of being more flexible in opportunity selection but less flexible in opportunity execution often led to poor results. For example, commenting on their entry into Sweden, executives at the medical imaging company remarked, “We could not sell into Sweden” and “They ran off a cliff. They went nowhere.” Performance in subsequent countries was much the same.
Focused Selection and Flexible Execution
Companies that were more focused in opportunity selection were generally more flexible in opportunity execution. This pattern surprised us because although these companies showed a consistent, focused pattern of disciplined search for opportunities, they were also remarkably flexible about how they pursued the selected opportunity. For example, the founders of a Singapore-based company that develops content for wireless providers thought long and hard about which markets to enter. Based on customer interviews and market observations, management outlined the best way to tackle multiple markets, concluding that they needed to start with the Japanese market, given that consumer trends appeared to diffuse from Japan to the rest of Asia. After entering Japan, leaders started selling digital content to Japanese wireless providers. But this required going head-to-head with Japanese content providers, who were technically competent and entrenched in the market. In light of these challenges, management decided to stop trying to sell their own company’s content in Japan and instead allied themselves with Japanese content companies to sell their partners’ content in Asia. As the chairman explained, “Instead of competing with them [Japanese content companies], we decided to partner with them and take their products and sell in Hong Kong, China and Japan. So we decided to change our strategy.” The outcome from flexibly executing the opportunity in Japan was greater success. As one leader remembered, “Once we decided to partner with [Japanese companies to start selling their content outside Japan], within three months we signed up quite a lot of very reputable content makers.” We observed a similar pattern with other companies in our study: Increased focus on opportunity selection meant increased flexibility in opportunity execution. (See “Focus and Flexibility in Opportunity Capture.")
Lessons About Opportunity Capture
Our research revealed two lessons about opportunity capture that are fundamental for growth in new markets: (1) Although opportunists can be flexible in selecting opportunities, they are less flexible in executing them; and (2) longer-term success partly depends on sequencing opportunities for learning.
Cognitive Lock-In
We observed that once opportunists started to execute opportunities, they often became less flexible. Our research suggests that opportunistic managers fell into what is called a cognitive dissonance trap — a psychological pattern wherein individuals who make a decision contrary to a prior belief set experience discomfort that leads them to reshape their beliefs and perceptions to match the discordant decision.5 Not surprisingly, we observed that opportunists (like strategists) generally believed they were careful decision makers. When opportunity selection was flexible and emergent, opportunists subsequently rationalized their opportunity choices, often focusing only on the positive aspects of the opportunity and ignoring the negative. In a similar vein, they tended to blame bad events associated with the selected opportunity on external circumstances beyond their control rather than questioning the way they chose the opportunity in the first place.
For example, executives at the Finland-based security software company flexibly selected opportunities. Entry into the first country, Sweden, was not planned out in advance. As the chief financial officer noted, “Sweden was very much ad hoc.” But this view was not consistent with the rationale managers gave later, when they suggested that Sweden was purposely selected as a location where employees could “cut their teeth.” When sales in Sweden fell short, leaders began placing the blame on external sources, such as their customers’ financial positions, rather than on internal ones, such as faulty strategy. Because the weak sales were attributed to external factors, leaders did not alter their method of executing opportunities. A senior leader described how the company worked with an outside lawyer to develop a standard template: “We just would not budge on that,” he said. These restrictive policies interfered with the company’s ability to work out agreements with several major customers when it was attempting to enter the United States. The experience underscores a paradox of opportunity capture: The more that leaders attempt to control opportunity execution, the less control they seem to have. The lack of control stems, in part, from trying to standardize solutions for opportunities that are inherently unique. Among opportunist companies, greater company maturity and increased executive experience seem to further decrease the chances of flexible opportunity execution. This may be because prior patterns for executing opportunities that have proved successful become increasingly rooted and institutionalized in company practices and executive actions.
A different pattern was evident among strategists. Particular opportunities within the broader set of possibilities were viewed ahead of time and found to be more attractive than others. As leaders selected the most attractive opportunities, this reduced the need to justify choices and therefore made leaders more likely to flexibly execute opportunities. As a result, they tended to improvise and experiment during the execution of opportunities, sometimes initiating radical changes to their product or business model. For example, one company we studied provided IT security software. After carefully studying its opportunity set, it decided to enter China. To management’s surprise, Chinese customers were suspicious about paying for software — they expected software to be free. So the team leading the effort switched gears and developed a hardware solution, which ended up selling very well. As the CEO recounted, “They [Chinese customers] only pay if they see hardware. It becomes an appliance … basically it’s a PC, and then they sell it to the customer.” In general, the strategists were more likely to pivot and change than opportunists when it came to opportunity execution. They were better able to abandon existing products and practices designed for opportunity execution and adopt new, more appropriate ones.
Sequencing Opportunities
On the surface, being more flexible would seem to help managers learn and adapt. However, we found that many of the managers and entrepreneurs who were the most flexible discovered an important lesson: It’s difficult to learn if you are always changing course. Sustained business success appears to depend not just on capturing one opportunity but also on stringing multiple opportunities together. Hence, longer-term success hinges in part on sequencing business opportunities: Understanding how to capture one discrete opportunity prepares managers and the organization to capture others.
Because opportunists often took advantage of the most immediate opportunities from the flow of possibilities, they found it very difficult to learn from and build off of their efforts. Managers of more established businesses often expressed confusion about the connection between the different opportunities they were chasing and uncertainty about the lessons learned. Managers of newer businesses complained that chasing multiple markets suggested a lack of vision. These executives had a morass of data — customer needs, feedback and product features — that pulled them in many directions. As a result, it was hard to know what was most important to do to succeed. For example, the CEO of the security software developer based in Finland described the difficulty his team had applying the lessons they learned, lamenting, “We should have had more focus and more country-by-country-specific plans rather than just trying to cover all the bases in a shotgun approach.” Similarly, a U.S. entrepreneur developing and testing tools for professionals recalled, “We were doing so many things — so many different tools and quiz formats — that it wasn’t clear what we were learning from any of it. Every time we made a change, we changed so many things [that] it wasn’t clear what caused what.”
By contrast, strategists who were more disciplined in opportunity selection also paid attention to how their opportunities were sequenced. They often selected smaller or more difficult markets, which allowed managers to learn from the opportunities. For example, an entrepreneur developing learning tools in the United States decided to eliminate nearly all of the solutions he had developed and focus instead on delivering quizzes to the education market. When asked why, he said, “By focusing on a single problem for a single market, we could actually really start to learn what solved customers problems … It was the best decision I ever made. We began to really understand what educators needed and what would lead to more revenue.” By narrowing his focus, the entrepreneur was able to increase revenue 400% in the next year before moving into the testing market for business enterprises, where he found even greater success.
Focus and Flexibility in Opportunity Capture
More focused opportunity selection appears to lead to more flexible opportunity execution. However, more flexibility in opportunity selection often leads to less flexibility in opportunity execution.
In other cases, we found that strategist managers sequenced opportunities to improve their legitimacy and credibility in the marketplace. Sometimes, managers of unproven businesses attempted to establish themselves with third-tier customers and then tried to move to second-tier customers and eventually to first-tier customers. For example, a provider of semiconductor solutions for wireless devices had aspirations to sell in the U.S. market but recognized that it first needed to establish a track record. To do so, it began selling to customers in Taiwan, then leveraged those sales to win customers in Korea, and eventually lined up customers in the United States, Germany and Japan. Depending on the circumstances, the pattern can also operate in reverse and involve starting at the high end and then expanding to the broader market. For example, Tesla Motors Inc. of Palo Alto, California, which designs and manufactures electric cars, decided that selling high-end electric vehicles would promote the sale of electric vehicles in other parts of the market.
Overall, creating a sequence for opportunity capture permits leaders to bring the present and future together in a way that facilitates team alignment and channels the energy and attention of geographically dispersed employees and managers. This helps organizations get into a rhythm and move forward in a synchronized fashion. Sequencing therefore provides an order for opportunity selection (that is, where organizations are now, where they want to go and the path to get there) that serves as a counterpoint to the more freewheeling manner of selecting opportunities based on emergent customer demand. More broadly, the use of sequencing reflects increased cognitive sophistication, as it takes time for individuals to gain insight about how opportunities can and should be ordered. This is perhaps one reason why the use of sequencing seems to occur more in older companies or in companies where founders have greater experience.
Managing the Opportunity Paradox
Leaders who acted more flexibly during opportunity selection (Which problem should we tackle?) tended to be less flexible during opportunity execution (How do we solve the problem?). Conversely, leaders who were more focused during opportunity selection tended to be more flexible in executing those opportunities. Focused selection and flexible execution lead to better outcomes than the reverse. The pattern of flexible opportunity selection leading to lower-performing, less flexible opportunity execution suggests another paradox for companies pursuing new avenues for growth and profitability. While being open to selecting new opportunities based on emergent customer demand appears attractive because it offers the promise of an immediate reward, that very openness may prevent the reward from being realized.6 A key implication for entrepreneurs and managers is that they should be disciplined in seeking to understand the nature of opportunities and linkages among them and then focus their resources on the opportunities that will help them move in a sequenced fashion from their current state to a desired end state.
How to Select Opportunities
At the start of the process, there are a few rules of thumb to guide you in choosing an opportunity. To begin with, resist jumping at the first potential opportunity or customer. Showing restraint may not be easy when cash is limited and the opportunity appears to be reasonable. Nevertheless, it’s important to focus on the longer term rather than the shorter term. What does the right opportunity look like, and how will it set you up for future opportunities? Remember the lessons on sequencing: Try to see if there is an internal sequence to a series of opportunities. Will one opportunity position you for another one? Will this opportunity help you learn about another one? Will it give you the legitimacy to capture future customers? The founders of a digital gaming company applied these criteria when they assessed their opportunities for building their consumer business in Asia. In their case, it meant starting in Japan and then progressively moving to Taiwan and Hong Kong before going after other markets. One founder remarked: “The digital content business is really a consumer business, and looking at Asia’s development for consumer business — whether it’s fashion or electronics or whatever, the trend always starts in Japan and progressively moves to Taiwan and then to Hong Kong and then to the rest of the market. I mean, this trend has been like that for the last 50 years. So when we pushed consumer-based, consumer-oriented digital products, that’s the same thing we did. We started by securing deals in Japan and pushed to the next most obvious market, which is Taiwan. Once [the] consumer products were accepted in Taiwan, then we progressed even more to other markets.”
Second, think about the full portfolio of choices before you, taking into account such criteria as the opportunity size (Is it large enough to be worth your time?); reachability (Does the company have or can it develop capabilities to capture the market?); and competition (How crowded is the field of competitors?). Many managers make the mistake of chasing small opportunities that are not worth the time, big opportunities that are out of reach or moderate opportunities that are too competitive.
Finally, we note that being strategic about which opportunities make the most sense may be particularly important for younger businesses. By considering the unique characteristics of each opportunity and its link to other opportunities, entrepreneurial companies can more easily and rapidly overcome inherent liabilities of newness (such as lack of resources and track record)7 by accumulating experience in a manner that builds on the past, while simultaneously increasing credibility.
How to Execute Opportunities
Once you have selected an opportunity, remember that opportunity execution requires having a flexible, rapid and iterative learning cycle. Therefore, while emphasizing common products and practices is important for capturing efficiencies, too much emphasis on routine actions can make it hard for companies to adapt or to walk away from losing situations in the future. Leaders should begin by designing a series of experiments to test what customers want and then rapidly adjust the offerings to meet their needs. Many of the companies we studied made radical changes to their products and business models (sometimes as significant as changing from selling software to selling hardware or from being content providers to being content resellers) upon entering a new market. Some of the most successful companies walked away from what seemed like an attractive opportunity after their initial experiments. In most cases, successful execution depended on regular interaction with customers and an openness to seeing negative results and adapting, rather than blaming negative results on someone else or firing salespeople.
The Opportunity Audit
How should you proceed if you suspect you have been too opportunistic in selecting new projects and too rigid in executing those opportunities? What should you do in that situation? In our view, you should conduct an opportunity audit built around the following questions:
How did you choose the opportunities you are currently pursuing?
If you could start over, which opportunities would you choose? Which opportunities make the most sense in terms of building a powerful sequence?
What are the results of your current efforts? What excuses have you made for negative results that place the blame externally? What could you be missing by doing this?
If the company were threatened with bankruptcy today, what one opportunity would you keep and which opportunities would you give up?
After answering these questions, don’t be afraid to make substantial changes to what you are doing. Throwing good money after bad is a common trap: People tend to increase their commitment to a failure they feel responsible for when, in fact, the most rational choice may be to simply let it go and adopt a more disciplined process for opportunity selection in the future. Although this may seem counterintuitive, it will help foster the flexibility you will need for opportunity execution.
Although flexibility in opportunity capture is extremely popular these days, few recognize that opportunity capture is a two-phase process involving opportunity selection and opportunity execution. Greater focus and discipline during opportunity selection through sequencing can increase effective flexibility during opportunity execution. By contrast, a lack of discipline in selecting opportunities can result in reduced ability to learn and adapt, which in turn can hurt chances for success. Overall, what appears to be at the core of successful opportunity capture is the intended capture of the expected along with the emergent capture of the unexpected. While the former is more controlled, future-oriented and top-down, the latter is more spontaneous, action-oriented and bottom-up. Moving back and forth between focus and flexibility during opportunity capture allows companies to glean the benefits of efficiency while still allowing room for change.
REFERENCES (7)
1. E. Ries, “The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses” (New York: Crown Business, 2011).
2. C.B. Bingham, “Oscillating Improvisation: How Entrepreneurial Firms Create Success in Foreign Market Entries Over Time,” Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 3, no. 4 (December 2009): 321-345.
